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ABSTRACT 
This thesis analyzes the corporate rebalancing behavior of German publicly listed firms 
subsequent to equity price shocks. The examined period (1990-2012) includes a total 
sample of 2,154 firm-years. It is found that German firms do not counteract stock 
induced changes in market-based capital ratios in the short run; whereas managerial 
rebalancing activity gradually gains importance in the long-term perspective. This 
behavior is largely in accordance with referential studies on the U.S. and the European 
stock markets. Further, a life-cycle extension of the applied research model has 
identified diverging rebalancing intensities across dissimilar corporate maturity classes. 
It was found, that those differences may be partly explained by respective adjustment 
cost levels. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background   
Each and every corporation is confronted with the decision of how to finance its 
business activity by finding a specific mix of debt and equity capital. Because this 
decision is of high practical relevance, capital structure theories have gained popularity 
among financial academia in the last five decades. Scholars have developed a wide 
array of research on the determinants of optimal capital structures and on the question if 
such optimal design exists at all. Financial managers and corporate finance departments 
are interested in how the overall cost of capital is affected by changes in the firm’s 
capital structure and, accordingly, how the value of the firm will be impacted (Bierman 
2003, 1f). Additionally, the globalization of capital markets – involving a large 
heterogeneity of sources and design of financing – as well as the recent global financial 
and credit crises gave rise to an enhanced interest in corporate leverage decisions and 
further complicated the above considerations regarding corporate capital structures.  
The discussion, which continues ever since the middle of the last century, is built upon 
the defining work by Modigliani and Miller (1958), who succeeded – under very 
restrictive perfect market assumptions – to show that the value of a firm is not 
dependent of its capital structure. Following this initial contribution, the corporate 
finance literature saw the emergence of a vast number of new theories and concepts – 
such as the trade-off theory and the pecking order theory, to name the two most 
renowned ones – which dropped the stringent assumptions made in the initial 
irrelevance proposition. Nonetheless, until today, only little agreement could be reached 
with regard to the fundamental drivers behind observable corporate capital structures 
and the related managerial decision-making process. The underlying reasons for the 
prevailing theoretical contradictions may be derived from, for example the high 
complexity of the issue (causes difficulties to determine cause-and-effect relationships) 
and low consistency of existing empirical studies.  
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1.2 Problem Formulation 
Following a widespread perception in the corporate finance literature, companies aim at 
maintaining a target capital structure that weights the costs and benefits related to 
different levels of indebtedness. Once the actual debt level diverges from the target, 
rational firms would be expected to readjust their debt ratio towards the target level 
accordingly (Myers 1984). However, the dynamic rebalancing argument is questioned 
by empirical research (i.a. Baker and Wurgler 2002). On the other hand, Graham and 
Harvey (2001) find in their large scale survey that more than two thirds of U.S. financial 
executives implicitly have a target debt level. 
Market-based capital structures can be seen to be subject to a variety of exogenous 
impacting factors. Specifically, this thesis emphasizes on the idea that a change in a 
company´s stock price implies an equivalent change of the market value of equity of the 
firm. This change, in turn, affects the market-value based leverage ratio. If a company 
targets a specific leverage ratio, this stock return-induced change in the capital structure 
had to be rebalanced with issuing activity in order to return to the set target level.  
Thus far, empirical knowledge on managerial rebalancing behavior of stock return-
induced capital structure changes is only available for the U.S. market (Welch 2004) 
and the consolidated European stock market (Drobetz and Pensa 2007). In this context, 
this thesis aims at extending the available research by studying the German capital 
market, which is chosen as a proxy for an opposing governance system as compared to 
the Anglo-Saxon U.S.-system and, also, has different features than the consolidated 
European market. 
La Porta et al. (1996) identify Germanic civil-law countries to be among the most 
creditor-friendly regimes. Owing to this fact, banks play a crucial role in the German 
capital market in two ways: first, in many companies banks are shareholders and, 
second, companies use bank credits as a frequented source of financing and long-term 
relationships between companies and banks (so called Hausbanks) can be observed. 
Thus, German companies rely to a greater extend on credit markets as opposed to U.S. 
companies where equity markets play a vital role. Furthermore, German capital markets 
present a more concentrated ownership structure of companies as opposed to the widely 
dispersed shareholder structure of Anglo-Saxon U.S. firms. Also, the proportion of 
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publicly listed companies in the so called market-based U.S. system is larger and stock 
markets are considered to be more liquid. In this context, an additional distinguishing 
aspect of the German bank-based system is the lack of an active market for corporate 
control (as a disciplining mechanism for managers to ensure shareholder value 
orientation and to mitigate principle-agent conflicts), which is also due to the 
concentrated ownership structure in German firms (Allen and Gale 1995; La Porta et al. 
1996). 
With regard to Drobetz and Pensa´s (2007) European study, it can be observed that the 
European market is not homogeneous due to the heritage of different judicial, financial 
and economic systems (La Porta et al. 1996). Hence, aggregated results on a European 
basis will offset the specific German capital market characteristics outlined above and 
will not emphasize on differing behavior in particular institutional settings. 
Confirmation can be found in Fan, Titman and Twite´s (2011) paper: they conclude that 
institutional factors as, for example, a country´s legal and tax system explain a 
significant portion of the variation in debt-to-equity balances and debt maturities. 
Accordingly, assimilating those factors in an overarching European context would 
relativize or even neglect country-specific capital market manifestations. In addition, 
Rajan and Zingales (1995) and Wald (1999) study the efficiency of the financial system 
of a country and argue that a country´s financial system affects capital structure 
decisions. 
1.3 Purpose and Research Objective 
Departing from the work conducted by Welch (2004), the first research objective of the 
thesis is to test whether companies in the German stock market adjust debt ratios 
targeting a specific level or if they allow their market-value based leverage ratio to 
change with stock prices.
1
 The degree to which firms rebalance their debt level towards 
a target subsequent to a deviation is of interest as it reveals information about the 
managerial behavior in accordance with differing prevailing theoretical concepts. In 
view of the fact that the German and U.S. American financial systems can be considered 
as “two polar extremes” (Allen and Gale 1995, 179), it is worthwhile to examine 
whether German companies follow the same capital structure mechanisms as their U.S. 
                                                 
1 Subchapter 2.4 deals with Welch´s (2004) work in detail.  
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peer companies. Thus, relevant knowledge can be gained on the question if managerial 
adjustment behavior depends on the institutional context and, therefore, the robustness 
of existing empirical research on this issue can be verified.  
The second research objective of this thesis is a life-cycle extension of the existing 
research on the dynamic rebalancing behavior of return-induced leverage changes. 
Conducted research in the field of corporate financing with respect to different degrees 
of corporate maturity provides several – yet inconsistent – argumentations on how firms 
change their debt-to-equity balance with regard to their degree of maturity. This thesis 
opts to broaden the theoretical understanding by investigating empirically if firms in the 
German stock market with diverging comparative maturities adopt different managerial 
rebalancing activity if their leverage ratios change due to fluctuations of the market 
value of equity. This is – to the knowledge of the authors – a so far unstudied dimension 
of research on the dynamic rebalancing decisions taken by firms.  
Clustering of the entire German sample according to the relative maturity of firms 
appears particularly relevant in view of the fact that corporate maturity correlates with 
several of the pivotal firm-specific determining factors of capital structures that have 
been identified in the relevant literature; e.g. asset tangibility, growth, firm size, 
profitability and price-to-book valuations (i.a. Titman and Wessels 1988; Rajan and 
Zingales 1995; Wald 1999; Hovakimian, Opler, and Titman 2001; Fama and French 
2005; Damodaran 2001, 511ff). 
1.4 Disposition 
This thesis is organized as follows: the second chapter lays the theoretical foundation 
for the consequent analysis and discussions. The chapter consists of four parts: first, the 
approach of measuring corporate leverage pursued in this thesis is discussed. Second, it 
provides a broad overview of the main acknowledged theories on corporate capital 
structures. Third, relevant considerations regard the connection between corporate life-
cycles and capital structures are presented. Fourth, it gives a compilation of referential 
studies and, thus, existing research on the impact of stock returns on capital structures is 
outlined.  
The third chapter presents the methodological approach of this thesis. It describes the 
data base for the German sample and further introduces the variables employed in the 
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regression model. Additionally, the Fama and MacBeth (1973) regression procedure 
that is used to obtain the empirical results is outlined. Finally, the empirical model 
specifications of the life-cycle extension are clarified and the validity, reliability and 
data quality of this thesis are discussed. 
The fourth chapter comprises of a presentation of the empirical findings on the German 
managerial rebalancing behavior as well as in terms of the life-cycle analysis. In detail, 
the chapter provides descriptive statistics and the obtained regression results. In 
addition, it contrasts the findings from the German market to the U.S. (Welch 2004) and 
European market (Drobetz and Pensa 2007). 
The fifth chapter provides a twofold discussion of the empirical results. It outlines 
implications of the attained results and links them to existing corporate finance 
literature. 
The sixth chapter summarizes the findings of this thesis, discusses limiting factors of 
the empirical results and outlines the scope for further research in consecutive studies.  
1.5 Target Audience 
This thesis is addressed to an audience with an understanding of finance and corporate 
finance; such as academia and researchers as well as corporate finance practitioners. 
Consequently, it is assumed that general financial terms and statistical mechanisms are 
commonly understood by the target audience and, hence, in-depth explanations will be 
disregarded.  
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2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS 
2.1 Measurement of Corporate Leverage 
Before the main theories in the field of corporate capital structures are introduced, the 
basis for measuring leverage ratios has to be clarified, which is also essential for 
understanding the underlying idea of this thesis. In this conext, Rajan and Zingales 
(1995) suggest that the correct measure of leverage depends on the objective of a study 
and, also, discuss different measures of leverage.  
Corporate leverage (i.e. the mix of debt and equity to fund business activity) may be 
measured both based on book-values or market-values of debt and equity. Harris and 
Raviv (1991) point out that some studies measure leverage as a ratio of book value of 
debt to book value of equity and others as book value of debt to market value of equity. 
Evidently, valid arguments can be put forward for the utilization of either. For instance, 
Thies and Clock (1992) argue that book values better reflect a firm´s target debt ratios, 
since market-based ratios are exposed to exogenous factors which are not under the 
management´s control.  
However, using book-value based measures of leverage has some significant 
limitations: first, book value of equity can be seen as a sheer “plug number” which 
merely represents the difference between the uses and sources of funds on the balance 
sheet (Welch 2004, 125). Second, book value-based leverage measures are, by 
definition, backward-looking while market-based ratios are forward-looking in the sense 
that they represent how investors value the company and its ability to generate future 
cash flows. Here, the market-based leverage ratio – among others – also determines the 
Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACC) which sets the hurdle rates for future 
investments (Baker and Martin 2011, 30f). Third, Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) 
argue that profitability and valuation of assets have a strong explanatory power of book 
value-based debt ratios. However, these factors are significantly dependent on 
applicable accounting rules which, consequently, can defer the real economic picture of 
a company and result in varying capital structures for different national accounting 
regimes and low cross-national comparability. Thus, this thesis studies corporate capital 
structures based on a market-based measurement of leverage. 
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With regard to the valuation of debt, Bowman (1980) showed that, because the firm-
specific correlation between the market and book values of debt is strong, the difference 
between using either of the two values is rather small. Furthermore, data limitations on 
market values of liabilities also lead to the fact that debt is measured in terms of book 
values as the best available proxy for the market value of debt.
2
  
2.2 Capital Structure Theories  
2.2.1 Modigliani & Miller Theorem 
The genesis of business financing in a modern sense was created by Modigliani and 
Miller (1958). Before their findings, there was no generally recognized theory on 
corporate capital structure. The Modigliani-Miller theorem is often referred as to the 
capital structure irrelevance principle: the value of a firm is unaffected by the choice of 
financing given complete and perfect capital markets. Complete and perfect capital 
markets imply that markets are frictionless, investors have homogenous expectations 
and all participants are atomistic (Modigliani and Miller 1958).
3
 
More specifically, Modigliani and Miller (1958) base their theory on the fact that a firm 
has a determined amount of future expected cash flows. Consequently, if a firm assesses 
whether to finance a particular quantity of assets with either debt or equity, it is merely 
the decision of how to split financing streams across capital providers. Those investors 
have the same access to capital markets and, therefore, the opportunity to set their own 
leverage which means that investors can create homemade leverage if it is not provided 
by firms or they can easily abdicate leverage that a firm offered but was not appreciated 
by the investor (Frank and Goyal 2008, 140). 
In their work, Modigliani and Miller (1958) set forth two propositions:  
M-M Proposition I:        
The market value of a company is constant irrespective of the amount of 
debt that the company makes use of to fund its assets. 
                                                 
2 This approach is in line with the referential studies (i.e. Welch 2004; Drobetz and Pensa 2007) which leads to a high 
degree of comparability of results from this thesis. 
3 No frictions is referred as to the inexistence of transaction costs such as taxes, bankruptcy costs, contracting costs. 
Homogenous expectations indicate that all market participants share the same information and that atomistic market 
participants – corporations and individuals – are price takers.  
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Following Modigliani and Miller (1958), proposition one will hold because of arbitrage 
opportunities: if two firms – one levered (    and one unlevered (    – with identical 
operations had different values, investors could buy and sell stocks and bonds in such a 
way as to replace one income stream for another income stream at a lower price, which 
would be beneficiary to the investors regardless of their risk tolerance. If investors 
exploited these arbitrage opportunities, the values of both firms would converge and 
finally eliminate the discrepancy in market values (Modigliani and Miller 1958).  
A crucial extension of the arbitrage-based theorem was made by Stiglitz (1969). He 
concluded in his extended model that the Modigliani-Miller theorem holds under much 
more general conditions than those assumed in the original version. The significance of 
the theorem is not subject to, for instance, the existence of competitiveness in financial 
markets or risk classes (Stiglitz 1969).  
Despite the conclusion from the first proposition (leverage has no impact on firm 
value), the second proposition shows that leverage has an effect on risk and the 
expected return on a firm´s equity: 
M-M Proposition II:  
    
  
 
 
 
   
The expected return on a company´s equity is an increasing function of the 
company´s leverage. 
Put differently, if a company adds debt to its corporate financial structure, equity 
holders will require more return due to the fact that additional debt increases the 
company´s risk owing to higher financial distress (Modigliani and Miller 1958).  
Modigliani and Miller (1963) added corporate income taxes to their former proposition 
(M-M I) and, owing to debt tax shields (   ), the value of the levered firm is 
(1)           . 
Taking debt tax shields in isolation, the optimal capital structure would consist 
completely of debt. Miller (1977) shows that the gain due to leverage (  ) can be 
expressed as:  
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(2)        
             
     
   , where 
   = corporate tax rate; 
     = personal tax rate on capital gains; 
     = personal tax rate on interest income and 
   = debt.  
Miller (1977) argues that even with differing taxes no optimal debt-equity ratio exists 
for an individual firm, but that an equilibrium aggregate leverage ratio prevails which 
equals the relative wealth levels of those with a tax preference for debt as opposed to 
equity. Auerbach and King (1983) refer to Miller (1977) and state that in a world in 
which investors face different tax rates, no equilibrium between debt and equity exists if 
no constraints are put in place. Since those constraints (e.g. personal borrowing 
constraints, short-sell constraints) represent a critical factor of the equilibrium they have 
to be modeled explicitly.  
However, conducted research after the publication of the Modigliani-Miller Theorem 
has shown that this theory fails under the consideration of additional aspects such as 
transaction costs, bankruptcy costs, agency conflicts and adverse selection (i.a. Fischer, 
Heinkel, and Zechner 1989; Jensen and Meckling 1976; Myers and Majluf 1984). From 
this starting point, several alternatives have been proposed aiming at the identification 
of key determinants of corporate financing decisions. Finally, the Modigliani-Miller 
theorem explains why financing decisions matter rather than giving a realistic reasoning 
of how firms finance their business. Accordingly, Modigliani and Miller (1958, 296) 
themselves state that “drastic simplifications have been necessary in order to come to 
grips with the problem at all” and, consequently, successive financial theories were 
based on the violation of the perfect markets assumptions by Modigliani and Miller. 
2.2.2 Trade-Off Theory 
Kraus and Litzenberger (1973) initially shaped the expression of the trade-off theory. In 
the broad financial literature the term trade-off theory is applied to different issues of 
related financial theories. In general, following the trade-off theory, a firm has to assess 
the costs and benefits of financing alternatives and find the right balance between them.  
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The original trade-off theory was based on the debate of the Modigliani-Miller theorems 
after the authors added corporate income taxes to their original work (Modigliani and 
Miller 1963). As discussed, in this changed setting, debt had a clear advantage over 
equity due to its tax shield effect. However, bankruptcy costs (or costs of expected 
financial distress) are clear counterweights of the tax benefits of debt. According to 
Myers (1984), as illustrated in Figure 1, companies gradually move towards previously 
set target leverage ratios while the aim is to balance marginal tax shield benefits and 
marginal costs of financial distress. However, Frank and Goyal (2008) emphasized 
some important aspects regarding this definition: the tax structures are much more 
sophisticated in reality than in theory and different tax assumptions might consequently 
lead to varying target ratios. Further, the nature of bankruptcy costs has to be analyzed 
and identified. More specifically, it has to be determined if those costs are one-time 
costs (or permanent such as a damaged reputation), fixed or increasing proportionally 
with the size of bankruptcy. 
 
 
Figure 1: The Static Trade-Off Theory of Capital Structures
4 
The trade-off theory can be viewed under static and dynamic considerations: the static 
trade-off theory describes a firm whose leverage is defined by a single period trade-off 
between tax shield benefits of debt and costs of expected financial distress. 
Additionally, there are other costs and benefits connected with the use of debt and 
equity as, for instance, agency costs that arise due to conflicts between owner and 
                                                 
4 Own illustration, taken from Myers (1984, 577). 
PV Tax Shields
Debt
Optimum
Firm value under all-equity financing
PV Costs of 
Financial Distress
Market Value of 
the Firm
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mangers as well as among different investor classes (Jensen and Meckling 1976).
5
 To 
summarize, it can be stated that the static trade-off theory describes that firms target a 
particular capital structure and if the current leverage ratio differs from the optimal one 
then firms will adjust their financing activities in such a way to adapt to the optimal 
leverage ratio level. 
The dynamic trade-off theory considers the time factor which is not taken into account 
in the static approach. Accordingly, a firm demonstrates a target adjustment behavior if 
the company has a target level of indebtedness and if deviations were adjusted over time 
(multi-period consideration). In the dynamic setting, the financing decision takes into 
account the financing need in the next period. If a firm will have to raise funds in the 
next period for new investments, it will either issue debt or equity or a combination of 
both (Frank and Goyal 2008).  
Since Stiglitz (1973), the dynamic trade-off theory research has been developed further 
and extended.
6
 Brennan and Schwartz (1984) were the first to study continuous period 
models that take into consideration uncertainty in decision-making, cost of financial 
distress and taxes. However, transaction costs were neglected. They state that firms 
retain high debt levels to take advantage of tax savings since they can react promptly to 
unfavorable shocks by readjustment without transaction costs. Fischer, Heinkel, and 
Zechner (1989) proposed a dynamic model which depends on the benefits of debt 
financing (e.g. tax advantages), potential costs of debt financing (e.g. bankruptcy costs), 
underlying asset variability, the riskless interest rate, and the size of the costs of 
recapitalizing. By taking into consideration transaction costs, the authors identified why 
firms will deviate from the optimal leverage ratio most of the time.
7 
Consequently, in 
the short term the firm´s leverage ratio will less likely respond to equity variations 
whereas in the long term the leverage ratio will be adjusted towards a firm-specific 
optimum capital structure.  
                                                 
5 Agency cost comprise of monitoring and bonding cost (Jensen and Meckling 1976). 
6 Stiglitz (1973), being a pioneer to modern dynamic trade-off theories, assessed the effects of taxation from a public 
finance perspective, whereas he assumed the non-existence of uncertainty. 
7 Fischer, Heinkel, and Zechner (1989) identify a range of an optimal capital structure with an upper and a lower 
bound instead of a particular optimal point. The firm only counterbalances its capital structure when the leverage 
transcends the predetermined limits. 
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When examining corporate financial rebalancing behavior, it can be argued that the 
trade-off theory plays a vital role. The theory predicts that firms – when engaging in 
financial rebalancing – opt to pursue a target capital structure.  
2.2.3 Pecking Order Theory 
Even before Myers (1984) published his article “The Capital Structure Puzzle” and 
provided his modified pecking order theory, the basic idea that firms display a particular 
pattern in the choice of financing alternatives was known. Already Donaldson (1961) 
studied a sample of large corporations and observed that management favored internal 
financing as a source of new funds and would only use external financing if it is 
unavoidable. However, Myers (1984) recognized that actual debt ratios varied widely 
across comparable firms. The explanatory power the static trade-off theory (measured 
by   ) was found to be unacceptably low and, thus, Myers (1984) concluded that this is 
either because firms deliberately deviate extensively from targets ratios or the targets 
themselves depend on factors which were not yet recognized or understood. 
Consequently, he extended the idea of a financing theory based on asymmetric 
information and adverse selection in financial markets – namely the modified pecking 
order theory. Myers (1984, 581) puts forward four empirical observations in the context 
of the pecking order theory: 
1. Internal financing is the preferred financing source by companies.  
2. Dividends are sticky, meaning that target payout ratios are only gradually 
adjusted in accordance with investment opportunities.  
3. If generated cash flows are smaller than investment requirements, 
companies first utilize existing cash balances. 
4. If external funding is necessary, then companies prefer to issue safe 
securities: first debt, then potentially convertible bonds (hybrids) and, as a 
means of last resort, equity. 
Myers´ (1984) modified pecking order theory was intended to represent a competitive 
model to static trade-off models, yet it does not define an optimal target debt-equity mix 
as each firm´s observed debt ratio represents its aggregate requirements for external 
finance. However, the pecking order theory, according to Myers (1984), has two 
caveats: first, it does not explain why dividends are sticky and second it only provides at 
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last a blurred idea when and why firms issue common equity. Myers (1984) himself 
gives an explanation to the latter: firms will issue equity at a certain point of time since 
firms face higher information asymmetry costs and higher financial distress costs as 
they climb up the pecking order. In order to reduce those costs, firms will periodically 
issue equity to generate financial slack (liquid assets or reserve debt capacity) to be 
enabled to pursue future positive net present value (NPV) projects as they arise.  
An important aspect in the context of pecking order theory is the adverse selection issue 
proposed by Myers and Majluf (1984). According to their model, managers have an 
informational advantage over external investors about the firms´ opportunities and the 
real value of the venture. If internal funds are insufficient to finance investment 
opportunities, firms will choose external finance sources while focusing on minimizing 
additional costs of asymmetric information. The problem addressed by Myers and 
Majluf (1984) is based on Akerlof´s (1970) “lemon” problem, who demonstrated how 
markets can fail when potential buyers cannot testify the quality of the good they are 
offered. Akerlof (1970) stated that buyers will demand a discount when facing the risk 
of purchasing a lemon (product of bad quality), which in turn discourages the potential 
sellers of non-lemon products to remain in the market. Transferring this logic to equity 
markets would mean that, since outside investors cannot estimate the true value of a 
firm, they will expect that only overvalued firms will issue equity and, hence, investors 
will demand a higher return on their investment. This imposes unattractive conditions to 
both high and low performing firms and consequently equity will be prohibitively 
expensive and firms will favor internal financing sources.  
Another perspective to the pecking order theory was added by Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) with the introduction of the agency theory. As already recognized by Butters 
(1945), executives prefer internal funding since external financing induces investor 
monitoring on the management. This preference bears the risk that available internal 
cash or securities are misused for negative-NPV projects (free cash flow hypothesis or 
overinvestment). On the other hand, the risk-shifting hypothesis and the debt overhang 
problem give further explanations on when and why firms will tend to raise equity and 
debt respectively. Specifically, the idea of the risk-shifting hypothesis is that 
shareholders are only interested in cash flows in non-bankrupt states and, hence, if the 
firm operates on their behalf, it will tend to accept projects that are too risky but have 
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large payoffs in good states of the world (Jensen and Meckling 1976). This behavior 
will shift the risk from shareholders to creditors, particularly if the firm is in desperate 
circumstances. The debt overhang problem arises because firms with risky outstanding 
debt tend to underinvest in positive-NPV projects since shareholders capture the entire 
cost of the project but receive only the fraction of increase in firm value after creditors 
have been satisfied (Miller 1977). 
Analyzing the pecking order theory in light of the corporate rebalancing behavior 
examined in this thesis, certain predications may be drawn. The theory indicates why 
firms are not willing to rebalance their market-based capital structure by equity 
infusions when their stock prices decline. However, it would not be able to explain why 
firms should abstain from debt issues in case of increasing stock prices since debt is 
assumed to be superior to equity. In addition, the pecking order theory highlights one 
aspect which is not explicitly considered in Welch´s (2004) study, namely internal 
financing. Hence, firms may not only be enabled to expand their capital base to finance 
their business venture by capital issuances, but can also use internal funds.  
2.2.4 Market Timing Theory 
The general tendency of firms to issue equity after a period during which the stock 
outperformed the broad market has long been recognized. For instance, both Brau and 
Fawcett (2006), who focus on the timing of Initial Public Offerings (IPO), as well as 
Graham and Harvey (2001) find in their survey-based research that financial executives 
state to aim at timing the market when making financing decisions in order to benefit 
from “windows of opportunities”. This – so called – equity market timing behavior, 
which had already been described by Asquith and Mullins (1986) in their paper on the 
signaling effects connected with equity financing, can generally be classified into two 
categories: first, being based on the pecking order theory, rational managers adapt their 
equity issuing activity based on time-varying adverse selection costs.
8
 Second, irrational 
managers (or investors giving room for exploitation by management) adapt to temporal 
mispricing in markets (Baker and Wurgler 2002).  
                                                 
8 Chang, Dasgupta, and Hilary (2006) connect corporate financing choices with the degree of analyst coverage, which 
is a method of information asymmetry reduction. They find that worse analyst coverage increases the probability of 
large and rare equity emissions. On the other hand, companies with superior financial reporting are seen to have 
improved flexibility to issue capital. 
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In efficient markets (i.e. market prices adequately mirror corporate opportunities and 
risks), companies need not be concerned with the timing of equity issues, since a 
company´s stock is always correctly priced in such markets where the cost of different 
sources of financing do not fluctuate independently (Modigliani and Miller 1958). If, 
however, markets are not entirely efficient, a firm may aim at minimizing its cost of 
capital by exploiting market inefficiencies in their corporate finance decisions.
9
 In this 
context, the market timing theory provides an alternative explanation, which includes 
behavioral considerations, to the classical theories on capital structures. The theory 
anticipates that firms time their equity issues in a way that new stock is floated when the 
stock prices are perceived to be overvalued, and buy back own shares vice versa. In case 
managers are incentivized to increase existing shareholders´ wealth, they can be 
expected to do so even at the expense of future owners (Stein 1996).  
The market timing theory does not necessarily differentiate between the two 
abovementioned forms of equity market timing: both market mispricings and dynamic 
asymmetric information (causing adverse selection costs) can be an incentive for market 
timing (Baker and Wurgler 2002). For instance, Chang, Dasgupta, and Hilary (2006) 
show that firms followed by less analysts (causes greater information asymmetry) have 
greater incentive to time the capital markets, which is in accordance with Myers and 
Majluf (1984) who argue that companies with larger information asymmetry are more 
easily misvalued by the market. 
Baker and Wurgler (2002) study the long-term effects of the – intuitively logical – 
equity market timing behavior on corporate capital structures. They find that observed 
capital structures are the cumulative result of past managerial efforts to time the equity 
market. Thus, past market-to-book values are found to persistently and significantly 
impact capital structure over at least a ten-year horizon. A target (or optimal) capital 
structure is not seen to exist, but capital structures are rather the result of accumulated 
past decisions to time the market. 
                                                 
9 However, market timing does not necessarily require markets to be inefficient, but manager´s to believe to be able 
to time the market is assumed to be sufficient by Baker and Wurgler (2002). 
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2.2.5 Summary 
Table 1 provides a brief comparison regarding the main dimensions of the three core 
capital structure theories available in the literature. With the abovementioned theories of 
capital structure in mind, this subchapter opts to present a brief conclusion of the 
implications of those theories for corporate capital structures.  
The trade-off theory determines that optimal firm and industry-specific (also time-
specific in dynamic trade-off) debt ratios exist due to the balance between varying tax 
shields and costs of financial distress. In contrast, the pecking order theory claims that 
observed debt ratios merely represent cumulative past decisions for different financing 
sources according to the hierarchy suggested by the pecking order. Ultimately, the 
market timing theory concludes that a firm´s debt ratio reflects the cumulative outcome 
of past efforts to time the equity market (“windows of opportunity”). Managers are seen 
to intend to exploit market inefficiencies in the timing of security issues rather than 
aiming for a target debt ratio. Here, the market valuation of a company implicitly 
impacts the capital structure decisions of a firm. 
With respect to equity issuances, the pecking order theory outlines that firms issue 
equity to investors only when no other sources of funds are available, whereas the 
market timing theory does not necessarily predict equity issues to be more expensive 
than debt. In contrast, the feasibility of equity (relative debt) depends on market 
conditions and resulting varying costs of equity. 
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 Trade-Off Theory Pecking Order Theory Market Timing Theory 
Originator 
Kraus and Litzenberger 
(1973) 
Myers (1984) 
Baker and Wurgler 
(2002) 
Focal point 
Trade-off between 
financing costs and 
benefits 
Hierarchy of financing 
alternatives 
Market-oriented 
perspective on financing 
choice 
Empirical / Theoretical 
Foundation 
Theoretical Empirical Empirical 
Violation of Modigliani-
Miller Theorem 
No frictionless markets 
(e.g. taxes, bankruptcy 
costs) 
No homogenous 
expectations 
(information 
asymmetry) 
No homogenous 
expectations 
(information 
asymmetry) 
Existence of 
Optimal/Target Capital 
Structure  
Yes No No 
Empirically tested 
Fama and French 
(2002); Shyam-sunder 
and Myers (1999) 
Fama and French 
(2002); Shyam-Sunder 
and Myers (1999) 
Hovakimian (2006); 
Kayhan and Titman 
(2007) 
Table 1: Comparison of Main Capital Structure Theories
10 
All three theories have been tested empirically: Fama and French (2002) as well as 
Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) assessed which of the pecking order and the trade-off 
theory is the more appropriate predictor of observed capital structures. Both studies find 
certain empirical support for both theories. Moreover, the empirical findings by Baker 
and Wurgler (2002) with regard to the market timing theory have been challenged by 
other research. For example, Hovakimian (2006) finds that the effects of equity market 
timing behavior on capital structure are small and temporary. While he generally agrees 
with the fact that equity issues are timed to phases of high market-to-book values (i.e. 
equity market timing), the negative effect of market-to-book values on a firms´ leverage 
and choices between debt and equity are attributed to variations in growth opportunities 
rather than market timing.
11
 Kayhan and Titman (2007) generally confirm the notion of 
corporate market timing, but state that the market timing effects on capital structure 
captured by Baker and Wurgler (2002) disappear after few years. 
                                                 
10 Own illustration, based on the preceding subchapters.  
11 As suggested by Myers (1977), companies with valuable growth opportunities (implies high market-to-book value) 
can be expected to have lower leverage ratios to avoid underinvestment due to the debt overhang problem (see 
subchapter 2.2.3). 
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2.3 Corporate Life-Cycles and Capital Structures 
With reference to the second research objective of this thesis, relevant considerations 
regarding the relationship of corporate maturity and capital structures are presented in 
this subchapter. 
The corporate life-cycle can be viewed as an adaption of the product life-cycle concept 
frequently referred to in the marketing literature.
12
 Here, increasing maturity of a 
company does not necessarily equal increasing firm size, although a positive correlation 
can be assumed. As discussed in subchapter 1.3, multiple firm characteristics – such as 
profitability and growth options – can be expected to vary with changing maturity. In 
addition, while a corporation is progressing in its life-cycle, the idiosyncratic risk and 
cash flows will change accordingly: cash flows increase in size and predictability and 
the firm-specific risk approaches the average risk of all firms which both impacts 
corporate finance alternatives and consequent decisions (Damodaran 2001, 511ff; 
Hovakimian, Opler, and Titman 2001). For example, the increased business risk at early 
life-cycle stages may imply that companies use less debt and, thus, reduce financial risk 
in order to even out the larger business risk. Furthermore, in accordance with Myers 
(1977), the total value of a firm equals the sum of the value of assets in place and the 
present value of growth opportunities. In this context, Hovakimian, Opler, and Titman 
(2001) put forward the argument that target leverage ratios can be seen to be determined 
as a function of the changing relative importance of these two components of corporate 
value. Firms are expected to rather utilize debt to finance assets in place and equity to 
fund growth opportunities. Assuming that a company has comparatively less growth 
opportunities in a more mature life-cycle stage, the leverage ratio can be assumed to 
increase with maturity. This is also in accordance with the static trade-off theory: 
increasing maturity implies increasing profitability and reduced business risk which 
favors higher debt levels due to higher tax shield gains and lower bankruptcy cost, 
respectively.  
                                                 
12 Miller and Friesen (1984) provide a review of relevant research on corporate life-cycles and recognize five 
commonly identified life-cycle stages: birth, growth, maturity, revival and decline which are principally in line 
with Damodaran´s (2001, 511ff) conceptualization. From their corporate management perspective, Miller and 
Friesen (1984) argue firms located in differing stages to vary in terms of their strategy, organizational structure and 
decision-making style. 
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If this Capital Structure Life-Stage Theory put forward by Damodaran (2001, 511ff) as 
well as Hovakimian, Opler, and Titman (2001) would hold, a firm´s capital structure 
was predictable at any given point it in its life-cycle. However, this theoretical 
argumentation is incompletely and infrequently directly empirically studied and proven. 
Frielinghaus, Mostert, and Firer (2005) find empirical support for a connection between 
life-cycles and capital structure. However, as depicted in Table 2, in contrast to the 
prediction by the Capital Structure Life-Stage Theory, they find that infant firms rely on 
debt instead of equity. More mature firms are observed to have sufficient internal funds 
and, thus, rely less on debt because sufficient cash flows are generated. Thus, business 
risk is implicitly argued not to be a major determinant of financing decisions. 
In some support of the Capital Structure Life Stage Theory, Kim and Suh (2009) as well 
as La Rocca, La Rocca, and Cariola (2011) find an inverted U-shaped relation between 
leverage and corporate life-cycle stages. Infant companies are less levered because of 
their dependency on external equity due to the lack of available debt financing (high 
riskiness of venture). More established firms have, on average, the highest debt ratio 
because of a reduced business risk and strong cash flows. Mature firms then have a 
reduced leverage because internally generated cash flows are larger than funding 
requirements for new projects. In a sense, this behavior can be argued to be in 
compliance with the predications derived from the pecking order theory: from the 
available financing sources, a firm is observed to choose the respective mode of 
financing that is most appropriate (according to the pecking order) at each point of its 
life-cycle. 
 Early Prime Late 
Frielinghaus, 
Mostert, and Firer 
(2005) 
High Leverage Low Leverage High Leverage 
Kim and Suh (2009); 
La Rocca, La Rocca, 
and Cariola (2011) 
Low Leverage High Leverage Low Leverage 
Table 2: Empirical Findings on Leverage over Corporate Life-Cycle Phases
13
  
                                                 
13 Own illustration, based on the preceding explications. The definition of the three life-cycle stages has been adapted 
from Frielinghaus, Mostert and Firer (2005). 
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2.4 Referential Studies 
This subchapter outlines prior research progress on the particular topic covered in this 
thesis. There is a multitude of factors that can cause corporate capital structures to 
fluctuate. In particular when measuring leverage based on market values of securities, 
exogenous factors can cause capital structure volatility and, as afore-mentioned, this 
thesis in concerned with the impacts of stock returns (i.e. appreciations or depreciations 
in stock prices over a period of time) on market-based indebtedness. The degree to 
which companies rebalance stock return-induced capital structure changes may give 
important insight as to whether managers aim for target capital structures. 
The originating research on the impact of stock returns on capital structures was 
conducted by Welch (2004), who concludes that stock returns are the most significant 
determinant of market-based capital structures: the variations in capital structures due to 
fluctuating market capitalizations are largely tolerated by corporate managers. Welch 
(2004, 115), however, argues that “in principle, there is more than enough capital 
structure–relevant corporate issuing activity to counteract stock return-induced equity 
growth. Firms are not inactive: they just do not choose to counteract their stock 
returns”. The passivity with regard to promptly rebalancing stock return impacts on 
indebtedness caused this approach to be termed as the managerial inertia theory.  
In his seminal study on the U.S. American stock market Welch (2004) finds that, over a 
horizon of one year, firms do not take actions to offset stock return-induced debt ratio 
changes and allow the ratio to fluctuate “one to one” with stock prices.14 Over an 
increasing time frame of five years, initial debt ratios become more important in 
explaining future actual debt ratios, implying that companies take measures to make up 
for changes in market capitalizations. However, stock return-induced capital structures 
(implied debt ratio) remain the dominant factor – even over a horizon of ten years. 
When a constant term is added to Welch´s (2004) basic regression model, which is 
included to represent a potential constant target debt ratio, the economic significance of 
the impact of initial debt ratios on future debt ratios is negligibly small. The importance 
of the constant term (in terms of its coefficient) increases with model horizon. Welch´s 
                                                 
14 The study Welch (2004) included all listed firms that had at least 10% of the market capitalization required to be 
listed in the Standard & Poor´s 500 index in the respective year between 1964 and 2000. In total, 2,679 firms where 
studied. 
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(2004) basic findings were by and large supported by Kayhan and Titman (2007) who 
find that past stock returns have a decisive and lasting impact on observable corporate 
indebtedness. 
Welch´s (2004) research has been complemented by the study by Drobetz and Pensa 
(2007) on the total European stock market in which, by and large, the empirical results 
from the U.S. American referential study are confirmed.
15
 However, certain 
discrepancies can be pointed out. In the short run (1 to 3 years), the results from both 
studies generally concur. However, the impact of stock return-induced debt ratios on 
future capital structures is slightly lower in the European sample. In the long run (10 
years), the coefficient of the initial actual debt ratio is larger than the coefficient of the 
stock return-induced capital structures, which is not the case in the U.S. sample. When 
the regression model is extended with a constant term, the effect is the same as in the 
U.S.: the coefficients for stock returns remain the approximately same, while initial 
actual debt ratios lose any importance in explaining future actual debt ratios, which 
implies that target debt ratios are important over long horizons (firms do not adjust 
period by period, but care about debt ratios in the very long run). However, the constant 
coefficient in the European sample is twice as large as in the U.S. sample and, thus, a 
greater importance of target debt levels in Europe may be concluded.  
To some extent, Baker and Wurgler´s (2002) research verifies the notion of the lasting 
impact of changing stock prices on corporate leverage ratios. However, they take an 
entirely different approach to the issue: while Welch (2004) studies managerial passivity 
(inertia) in adjusting for stock return-induced changes in debt ratios, Baker and Wurgler 
(2002) argue for managers that actively take advantage of favorable market valuations 
by issuing corresponding securities. Thus, although taking entirely different starting 
points, the managerial inertia of rebalancing and market timing concepts can even be 
argued to be supportive of eachother: active exploitation of appreciating stock prices by 
issuing equity concurrently implies the inability to counterbalance return-induced 
reductions in leverage.  
The managerial inertia and market timing frameworks have been complemented with 
the issue of adjustment costs by Leary and Roberts (2005) who criticize that many 
                                                 
15 The study by Drobetz and Pensa (2007) included all firms listed in the Dow Jones STOXX 600 benchmark index 
between 1990 and 2005. In total, 425 European firms were studied. 
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studies on capital structure adjustment implicitly assume costless financing activity. 
They argue that adjustment costs can cause rebalancing activity to be infrequently if 
managers wait for the advantages of rebalancing to become sufficiently large to 
outweigh the costs. Thus, despite the fact that adjustment costs can be seen to impact 
the speed of adjustment after deviations from target leverage ratios, Leary and Roberts 
(2005) argue that firms gradually respond to equity shocks in the years subsequent to 
the event and suggest that equity shock effects persist in the short-term while, in the 
long-term, firms engage in rebalancing activities towards target leverage ratios. Also the 
total adjustment costs are tried to be reduced by only rebalancing significant deviations 
away from a target range, which is in line with Fischer, Heinkel, and Zechner (1989). In 
contrast to the conclusion drawn by Welch (2004), managers are not expected to be 
indifferent towards the market-based leverage ratio, but the permanence of stock return-
induced changes of leverage is argued to be due to efforts to increase efficiency of 
financing. Yet, the empirical findings of both studies correspond; only the interpretation 
differs. Drobetz and Pensa (2007) also query Welch´s (2004) one-sided interpretation of 
managerial indifference towards short-term fluctuations in market-based capital 
structures.  
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3 METHODOLOGY   
3.1 Research Approach and Methodology 
In general, two very distinct approaches to research studies and the relationship 
between empirics and theory exist: first, inductive research where theories are generated 
from empirical observations. Second, deductive research where hypothesis and 
predictions derived from existing theories are tested for their correctness (Bryman and 
Bell 2007, 11ff). The research objectives covered in this thesis follow the deductive 
approach since the predictions derived from Welch´s (2004) theory are, on the one 
hand, tested in the German institutional setting and, on the other hand, examined for its 
generalizability in explaining diverging readjustment behavior of firms at different life-
cycle stages. 
A quantitative research methodology is used in this study in order to investigate the two 
research questions of this thesis empirically. The specifications of the quantitative 
analysis will be set out in the subsequent subchapters.  
3.2 Sample 
The referential U.S. data set used by Welch (2004) comprised an extensive scope of 
54,211 qualifying firm-years in total (from 1962-2000). In order to replicate this broad 
data sample across firm sizes and industries, this thesis does not only consider the most 
capital intense German stock index DAX (Deutscher Aktien Index), but additionally the 
TecDAX, SDAX and MDAX indices that comprise German technology as well as small 
and medium capitalization companies, respectively. The data set was created using the 
Thomson Reuters Datastream database for the period from 1990 to 2012.
16
 Only firms 
with two or more consecutive years in one of the indices were included in the data set 
because capital structure dynamics are the subject of this thesis. Twelve firms did not 
comply with this precondition and, consequently, had to be excluded from the sample. 
Additionally, only firm years were included in the sample during their presence in either 
of the indices, meaning that firms were disregarded as soon as they were delisted.
 17
  
                                                 
16 See Appendix I for a description of the data obtained from Thomson Reuters Datastream. Despite the fact that the 
DAX was established in 1987, the specific observation period from 1990 to 2012 was selected in order to represent 
a broad picture of the companies of the stock market after the German reunification. 
17 The removal of delisted firms from the sample may cause a survivorship bias. However, the observed German 
sample represents a wide range of firm performances in terms of stock returns, as it can be observed in Table 4.  
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The number of sample firms grows from 21 in 1990 to 135 in 2011 and decreases to 45 
in 2012. Due to German accounting standards (Art. 267 and 325-327, German 
Commercial Code), in particular small and medium-sized listed companies have not yet 
disclosed their annual reports for the financial year 2012 and, consequently, 80 firm 
years had to be excluded in 2012.The average amount of sample firms per year is 106. 
The significant difference in the number of firms can be explained by the fact that only 
the main DAX existed in 1990 and the MDAX, SDAX and TecDAX were only 
established in 1994, 1999 and 2003 respectively.
18
 Furthermore, firms were excluded 
from the sample if not all required data was available for the periods of being listed on 
either of the indices. Neglecting firm-years with incomplete data is not anticipated to 
bias the empirical findings since the incompleteness of market data is not expected to be 
notably correlated with the studied managerial readjustment behavior. In addition, since 
firms from the financial sector (banks, insurances and financial services providers) have 
to comply with specific rules and regulations, their capital structure is significantly 
predetermined and influenced by exogenous factors unrelated to direct financing 
activities (i.a. Rajan and Zingales 1995; Fama and French 2002). Hence, this thesis 
excludes 41 financial firms. 
Finally, the data is arranged into an unbalanced panel where the number of annual 
observations is not the same across individual firms. For that reason, the amount of 
observations (  ) per time period ( ) differ: 2,154 firm-years qualify in total and have 
data in at least two consecutive years; 1,591 over three years; 1,158 over five years; and 
455 over 10 years.  
3.3 Variables 
This thesis analyzes whether firms counteract fluctuations in their capital structure that 
exist due to changes in stock prices in order to maintain a constant target debt ratio or 
whether companies tolerate to let their debt ratios fluctuate with their respective stock 
prices. The following analysis of capital structure is based on a market-based 
measurement of leverage for the reasons outlined in subchapter 2.1.  
                                                 
18 The results presented later in this thesis were checked for potential biases caused by the fact that the number of 
firms and, accordingly, the total number of observations differs dramatically between the early and late time 
periods of the sample. However, no systematic trend in the results of the time-series of cross-sectional regressions 
could be identified. 
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In accordance with Welch (2004), this thesis estimates the following basic regression 
specification: 
(3)                                     .  
Equations (4) to (10) explain the components and subcomponents of equation (3) in 
detail. The term     denotes the Actual Corporate Debt Ratio and     is the Implied 
Corporate Debt Ratio.     is defined as the quotient of the book value of debt (   and 
the market value of equity ( ) plus the book value of debt (as a proxy for the market 
value of debt) 
(4)       
  
     
. 
Furthermore,     is the debt ratio that results if the company neither issues any (net) 
debt nor equity and permits its capital structure to completely capture any stock return 
effects between period   and    , 
(5)           
  
                
.  
Here, the term   denotes stock returns net of dividends from time   to time    . 
However, according to Welch (2004) in this setting it is not of any relevance if 
dividends are included or not.
19
 Net stock return could not be obtained directly from the 
database used for this thesis (Thomson Reuters Data Stream). Consequently, net stock 
returns were estimated as follows, 
(6)         
       
  
   
Equation (3) depends on the dynamics of capital structure as, for instance, changes in 
debt or equity. Specifically, the amount of debt changes with new debt security issues, 
retirements and changes in the value of debt, 
(7)                   . 
                                                 
19 Welch (2004) argues that, due to the fact that this type of study analyses debt ratio dynamics mainly in cross-
section, a low cross-sectional dispersion of dividends leads to fact that to the fact that conducting the analysis based 
on gross or net stock returns has no significant impact on the achieved results. In view of the fact, that dividends 
from the German sample have a very low cross-firm standard deviation (1.2% over one year, see Table 3), results 
of any subsequent analyses will not be affected when either using gross (i.e. capital gains) or net stock returns. 
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     represents the Total Debt Net Issuing activity. When      is positive (negative) 
this indicates a net debt issue (retirement) from time   to time    , 
(8)                   . 
Accordingly, the same logic can be applied to equity changes, 
(9)                             ,  
where     represents the total Equity Net Issuing activity. Again,     cannot be 
identified directly from the given database and, therefore, it is determined as,  
(10)                            .  
Subchapter 4.1.3 will add an additional perspective on the dynamics of capital structure 
by identifying the explanatory power of individual components of debt ratios and 
dynamics for a firm´s actual debt ratio. In addition to equations (4) and (5), equations 
(12) to (15) will be utilized for decomposing debt ratios.  
Both Drobetz and Pensa (2007) and Welch (2004) use equation (11) in order to find 
more distinguishing explanatory power of how capital structure is determined when 
only corporate issuing activity is taken into consideration. 
(11)        
            
                                   
 
All issuing and dividend activity can be described as: 
(12) 
            
                                 
.  
In the same vein, the formula can be adopted when dividends (   ) are disregarded, 
(13) 
            
                        
. 
Similarly, the effects for (net) equity issuing activity are 
(14) 
  
                       
,  
and the effects for (net) debt issuing activity 
(15) 
            
               
 
respectively.  
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3.4 Empirical Model 
In accordance with both Welch (2004) as well as Drobetz and Pensa (2007), the Fama-
MacBeth procedure is utilized in this thesis to estimate the impact of changes in market 
capitalization on capital structures. The data typically observed in corporate finance 
(also in this thesis) have cross-sectional and time-series elements (i.e. financial data 
over many firms as well as time-series observations for each firm). The main reason 
utilizing the Fama-MacBeth procedure as opposed to a conventional Ordinary Least 
Square (OLS) panel regression is because it does account for standard errors, corrected 
for cross-sectional correlation.
20
 The same correction could be achieved by estimating 
time-series averages first, and then running pure cross-sectional regressions (Cochrane 
2005, 244ff). However, this thesis follows the first approach in order to achieve a higher 
comparability to referential studies who also pursued the Fama-MacBeth procedure 
(Welch 2004; Drobetz and Pensa 2007).  
Originally, Fama and MacBeth (1973) developed the regression approach to test the 
validity of asset pricing models such as the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM).
21 
The 
method estimates the beta and risk premium for any risk factor that can be expected to 
determine asset prices. The parameters are estimated in three main steps (three pass 
technique)
22
: first, time-series regressions are run to determine the asset´s beta (i.e. 
regressing asset returns against market returns). Second, cross-sectional OLS 
regressions are performed for each period to obtain the risk premium for every factor 
(i.e. regress asset returns of a period on the estimated betas from step one). Third, the 
final coefficients are derived from the time series arithmetic means of periodical cross-
sectional regression parameter estimates and standard errors are estimated from time-
series the standard deviation of cross sectional regression coefficients (Fama and 
MacBeth 1973; Cochrane 2005, 244ff). 
The Fama-MacBeth procedure is a standard approach in financial empirics when 
performing regressions on sample data with panel structure (i.e. the sample comprises 
of cross-sectional as well as time-series elements). The approach has been frequently 
                                                 
20 Cross-sectional correlation in financial data appears to be suggestive: for instance, if one firm’s stock return is 
remarkably high in a particular month, another firm’s stock return is also likely to be very high in the same month 
(Cochrane 2005, 247ff). 
21 Thereafter, the Fama-MacBeth approach has been deployed in a wide array of academic research. 
22 The Fama-MacBeth approach is frequently referred as to a two-step procedure. The authors of this thesis, however, 
identify three distinct steps.  
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applied because it accounts for cross-sectional correlation of residuals across firms 
within panels (Cochrane 2005, 244ff).
23
  
One of the main shortcomings of the three-step Fama-MacBeth procedure is that the 
first step estimates asset betas with errors. If, then, the estimated results from the first 
step are deployed as independent variables in the second step, the model is performed 
under the assumption that values derived from the first step equal the true market 
values, which cannot be expected to be the case. This complication causes the “error-in-
the-variable” problem, which predicts that the estimations from the second step of the 
procedure will be biased in the sense that estimated values from the first step carry 
errors which will translate into erroneous estimations from the second step (Fama and 
MacBeth 1973; Cochrane 2005, 247f). Fama and MacBeth (1973) deal with this issue 
by grouping stocks into twenty portfolios. Assuming that errors from the first step are 
not perfectly correlated across securities, they can be expected to counterbalance one 
another within the portfolio and, therefore, reducing portfolio-wide measurement errors 
(diversification effect). Moreover, Shanken (1992) proposed an approach to (upward) 
adjust standard errors for the “error-in-the-variable” problem, which will affect t-
statistics accordingly. This procedure would be an alternative to the original Fama-
MacBeth approach of making use of portfolios in order to correct for the errors in 
variable estimations. 
Following Welch (2004), the Fama-MacBeth procedure deployed in this thesis is a 
variation of the original approach and has been adjusted to the specific needs of the 
research question. The initial three-step approach is reduced to a two-step procedure: 
the time-series regressions from the initial first step need not be performed because, as 
depicted in subchapter 3.3, the regressors (      and         ) for the subsequent step 
can be computed from readily observable capital market data. For this reason, an 
aggregation of companies in portfolios of companies in order to avoid the above-
mentioned “error-in-the-variable” problem is not necessary because the input values 
represent true market values and do not carry estimation errors. Also, the Shanken 
(1992) correction of standard errors does not have to be performed for the same reason. 
                                                 
23 Furthermore, specification tests have been conducted in order to test for normal distribution, heteroscedasticity, 
multicollinearity, cross-sectional correlation and serial correlation. The test results, which have been incorporate in 
the conducted analysis, can be viewed in Appendix III.  
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The first step (second step of the original Fama-MacBeth approach) of the regression 
model follows the regression specification stated in equation (3) and the cross-sectional 
coefficients   ,    and    are estimated with the OLS method for every annual period 
  = 1, 2, ...  . In the second step (third step of Fama-MacBeth), the mean of the time-
series of estimated cross-sectional coefficients of the first step is computed as 
(16)     
 
 
    
 
   . 
Standard errors are derived from the time-series standard deviation of the cross-
sectional coefficients 
(17)         
 
  
       
 
     . 
The    values are time series means of cross-sectional coefficients of determination  
(18)        
 
 
     
 
    
and the Fama-MacBeth t-statistic is derived from the quotient of equation (16) and (17) 
(Fama and MacBeth 1973; Cochrane 2005, 247 f; Welch 2004). 
With the regression specification outlined in equation (3), Welch´s (2004) managerial 
inertia theory, which incorporates behavioral aspects of managers, can be tested 
quantitatively: the respective coefficients of the independent variables 
      and           indicate the relative importance in impacting future actual debt 
ratios       . From this fact, Welch (2004) derives two extreme hypotheses: first, if 
    1 and     0, a perfect rebalancing of market-based capital structures after stock 
return-induced changes can be expected and a strong impact of historical capital 
structures on current debt ratios may be concluded (perfect readjustment). Second, if 
    0 and      1, firms can be expected to completely accept fluctuations in capital 
structures due to changing market capitalizations (perfect non-readjustment or 
managerial inertia).  
The basic regression model is run with as well as without a constant term (  ), which 
can be seen as accounting for the importance of a constant target leverage ratio. The 
specification without an intercept is set up to estimate the direct competition of 
     and          in explaining        (Welch 2004). 
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3.5 Life-Cycle Extension 
Following the approach of DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Stulz (2006), the ratio of retained 
earnings to total accounting equity (     ) is used as a proxy for the degree of maturity 
of a specific company.
24
 Following this logic, firms with little retained earnings as 
compared to the total amount of equity are assumed to be comparatively immature 
ventures (growth firms), while companies which have accumulated extensive retained 
earnings are likely to be mature (value firms with reduced growth opportunities). As the 
      ratio indicates the earned proportion (as opposed to contributed fraction) of the 
book value of equity, it describes the self-financing ability of a company: mature firms 
can use accumulated past profits for funding and, on the other hand, immature firms are 
expected to be in a capital infusion phase of the corporate life-cycle. Moreover, Altman 
(1968) made use of a similar ratio (    ) as a proxy for bankruptcy risk, arguing that 
the ratio captures the maturity of a firm and that the bankruptcy risk decreases with 
increasing maturity.  
In order to cluster the entire sample according to the comparative intra-annual maturity 
of the respective company, firm-years are allocated to the relatively mature (immature) 
subsample depending on whether the company´s       ratio is above (below) the 
median firm´s ratio of the respective sample year. Thus, the total sample is divided into 
two equally sized subsamples.
25
 
The empirical analysis of the subsamples is accomplished by setting up a dummy 
variable (      ) that assumes the value 1 (0) if the concerned       ratio is above 
(below) the respective median value of the year. Then, the basic regression specification 
(equation 3) is performed for both subsamples; i.e. the entire Fama-MacBeth regression 
procedure is executed two times separately on the total subsample over all time horizons 
subject to the condition that the dummy variable equals 0 (for the immature subsample) 
and 1 (for the mature subsample), respectively:  
 
 
                                                 
24 DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Stulz (2006) used the       proxy ratio to study the changing dividend payout 
behavior over the corporate life-cycle and discover that the       ratio is a major determining factor of the 
probability of a firm to grant dividends. Thereafter, this proxy has been frequently employed in other studies (i.a. 
Kim and Suh 2009; Owen and Yawson 2010). 
25 In this process, 18 firm-years had to be excluded in total due to missing data on retained earnings. 
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(19)                                      with          1 
or 
 
(20)                                      with          0 
In this context, it is explicitly pointed out that the above clustering process according to 
corporate maturity only allows for an analysis of comparative maturity within the 
German sample of this thesis; not absolute maturity in accordance with predetermined 
thresholds for respective life-cycle phases.  
3.6 Validity, Reliability and Data Quality  
The validity of a study refers to the accuracy of indicators to actually measure particular 
characteristic in a given problem setting and, therefore, directly impacts the relevance of 
a study (Bryman and Bell 2007, 164ff). The above-mentioned measures of corporate 
leverage as well as the approach of quantifying managerial readjustment behavior have 
been deployed in studies published in international scientific journals (i.a. Welch 2004) 
and can, for that reason, be considered sufficiently valid. Similarly, the approach of 
using the ratio of retained earnings to total book value equity as a proxy for the maturity 
of a company has been made use of in the relevant literature (i.a. DeAngelo, DeAngelo, 
and Stulz 2006; Kim and Suh 2009). It should, however, be considered that studying 
managerial decision-making on capital structures may involve certain behavioral 
aspects that are only limitedly quantifiable and may not be captured by this thesis.  
The concept of reliability characterizes the repeatability of a study in the sense that 
consistent results can be reproduced in repeated tests with comparable methodologies. 
Also, including the aspect of subjective biases, if the study was to be repeated by other 
researchers (Bryman and Bell 2007, 162ff). In view of the fact that the methodological 
approach followed in this thesis has been presented transparently, a reproduction 
appears to be possible. In addition, the data base used in this thesis is directly based on 
the data from data from Thomson Reuters Datastream and, hence, all data used in thesis 
can be regarded as publicly accessible. 
In order to test the robustness of the Fama-MacBeth regression type used in this thesis, 
an alternative statistical approach is applied. Appendix IV displays the results from the 
alternative approach and verifies the robustness of the obtained results. 
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In order to facilitate the large sample studied in this thesis, the required market and 
accounting data was retrieved from Thomson Reuters Datastream, which has to be 
considered as a secondary source of data because the data was not collected by the 
authors themselves. For that reason, the accuracy of the empirical results depends on the 
quality of secondary data (i.e. the consistency between the secondary data and the actual 
market data and account data as published in the financial reports of the respective 
companies) as obtained from Thomson Reuters Datastream. 
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4 EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
4.1 Rebalancing in the German Stock Market 
4.1.1 Descriptive Statistics 
a) Standard Descriptives 
Table 3 presents summary statistics of the basic variables. All capital structure 
dynamics are calculated according to equations (4), (7) and (9). 
Panel A of Table 3 provides an overview of firm size and leverage characteristics in the 
German sample. Assuming that our sample is representative for the entire German stock 
market, the average listed German firm has a mean (median) market value of EUR 
12,209 million (EUR 1,352 million). The mean (median) accounting value amounts to 
EUR 9,961 million (EUR 958 million). On average, the starting actual leverage is 
approx. 50%. By comparing this finding to existing research on the Anglo-Saxon 
institutional environment (i.a. Welch 2004), the initial hypothesis (subchapter 1.2) that 
banks play a more important role in the German bank-based corporate financing system 
U.S. market may be confirmed. Relative to the sample mean, the average deviation from 
the sample´s mean market value is substantially lower for the German sample of this 
thesis (variation coefficient of 2.7) as compared to the U.S. sample (4.3, unreported in 
Welch´s (2004) work). Interestingly, a similar relation holds for the accounting-based 
measure for the value of assets (2.9 in Germany; 4.6 in the U.S.). Put differently, the 
sample covered in this thesis appears to be less dispersed in terms of both book and 
market value than the referential U.S. sample (Welch 2004). 
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics – Entire Sample 
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Panel B presents an overview of the capital dynamics of German firms.
26
 In the German 
sample, the mean firm issues approximately 2.9% debt and 1.2% in equity over a one-
year period. It is readable from this fact that German firms prefer to issue debt as 
opposed to equity, which may indicate behavior in accordance with the pecking order 
theory. Compared to Welch´s (2004) U.S. sample, German firms, on average, issue less 
capital both in terms of equity and debt over all observed time horizons.
27
 For instance, 
over the five-year period German firms issue only 19.1% debt and 6.9% equity, whereas 
the U.S. firms issue 27.4% in equity and 21.0% in debt respectively. In addition, 
German firms also deviate from the consolidated European sample (Drobetz and Pensa 
2007).
28
 German firms issue less debt than the average European firm (31.5% on 
European level, five-year period). Also, German firms issue significantly less equity 
than firms in the rest of Europe. On average, as indicated in row 7, German firms 
generate annual gross stock returns (i.e. including dividends) of 4.6%, of which they 
pay out 1.1% as dividends. Hence, they achieve a 3.2% net stock return-induced growth 
in equity. These figures are low compared to the U.S. and the European samples (U.S.: 
7.0%; EU: 7.3%). Also, over a longer time horizon of, for instance, five years the 
normalized net stock returns of the German sample remains considerably below the 
U.S. and consolidated European reference sample. Underlying reasons for the lower 
German net stock returns may be the different observed time horizons of the studies 
(U.S: 1960-2000; EU: 1990-2005). The activist equity and total expansion figures 
explain if firms deliberately change their capital. Over all investigated time horizons, 
the actively managed expansion (i.e. activist total expansion) is as almost as large as the 
return-induced growth in equity. Here, a substantial proportion of the expansion stems 
from the net debt issuing activity. This finding implies that corporate issuing activity is 
potentially large enough to counterbalance a considerable part of the stock return 
influence on the market-based capital structure. This finding is largely in accordance 
with the evidence from the U.S. and consolidated European reference studies. 
 
  
                                                 
26 In order to obtain more comparable results from data with different bases, all variables were normalized by the 
respective firm´s market value. Further, in order to reduce the effect from potential outliers, the results were 
winsorized at the upper and lower fifth percentile of each variable’s distribution.  
27 Hereinafter, when referring to the U.S. sample, Welch (2004) is referenced. 
28 Hereinafter, when referring to the European sample, Drobetz and Pensa (2007) are referenced.  
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b) Grouped Data 
As discussed in subchapter 3.4, the clustering of firms into portfolios as a first step of 
the Fama-MacBeth procedure is not required in this thesis. Nevertheless, following 
Welch´s (2004) approach, a clustering of firms according to their comparative stock 
market performance is performed so that observable capital structure relevant properties 
of firms with differing characteristics can be compared.
29
  
As readable from Panel A in Table 4, the median firm in the weakest performance-
decile has a median return of roughly -48% over the annual time horizon, whereas the 
highest quintile reaches a net stock return of 64%. This spread increased with the time 
horizon of the model. However, compared to the U.S. sample and, also, to the 
consolidated European sample this spread is rather small. For instance, over five years 
the median U.S. corporation in the highest performance-decile reaches a net stock return 
of 406% and the lowest decile has a return of -106%. Thus, the impact on market-based 
indebtedness by equity price shocks appears to be more pronounced in the U.S. market.  
Row 1 and 2 indicate how much debt (         ) and, respectively, equity (        ) 
firms issue across different performance-deciles. German firms correspond in their 
issuing activities to the European issuing behavior, but not to the U.S. issuing pattern. 
More specifically, unlike the U.S. where firms with higher (lower) stock returns issue 
more equity (debt) than debt (equity), German firms issue both more debt and equity 
with increasing stock returns, which is well-observable over the five-year horizon. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
29 In doing so, all firm-years from the sample were first sorted by calendar year and, in a second step, by sorted sales 
which as a proxy for firm size. Finally, firm-years from each size-decile are arranged into ten equally large 
performance-deciles by their respective net stock return in the relevant time frame (between time   and    ). This 
procedure facilitates sorting firms into portfolios based on stock-performance relative to similarly sized peers and, 
also, year effects are controlled because stock-performance is only compared intra-annually. All figures in the 
Table 4 are medians of the respective bins in order to account for the large dispersion of values within bins. 
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Table 4: Descriptive Statistic – Performance-Portfolios 
Row 4 shows the activist (or managed) equity expansion, meaning that equity issuing 
(        ) is netted against dividends (        ). Since the level of accumulated 
dividends paid to shareholders increases with longer time horizons and the net equity 
issuing activity is too low to offset the dividend payout, the value for activist equity 
expansion is negative across all observed performance-deciles and time horizons. Row 5 
displays the total activist expansion corrected for dividends. Except for the annual 
horizon, German firms with higher stock returns engage in more capital expansion than 
-48% -24% -15% -5% 4% 11% 19% 32% 45% 64%
1. Net debt issuing TDNIt,t+k 1.2% 1.1% 1.1% 1.8% 0.8% 1.7% 2.1% 1.6% 1.6% 2.4%
2. Net equity issuing ENIt,t+k 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
3. Dividends DIVt,t+k 0.4% 0.7% 0.9% 0.9% 1.0% 1.0% 0.9% 0.9% 0.8% 0.8%
4. Activist equity expansion ENIt,t+k - DIVt,t+k -0.3% -0.6% -0.6% -0.8% -0.9% -0.9% -0.9% -0.8% -0.7% -0.4%
5. Activist total expansion TDNIt,t+k + ENIt,t+k - DIVt,t+k 1.4% 0.0% 0.5% 0.6% -0.4% 0.3% 1.2% 1.2% 0.9% 2.7%
6. Induced equity growth xt,t+k * Et -16.1% -10.0% -6.3% -2.4% 1.4% 4.5% 6.6% 12.2% 15.6% 24.6%
7. Starting ADR ADRt 58.2% 54.1% 49.5% 50.4% 54.0% 48.3% 54.1% 50.5% 54.0% 55.5%
8. Ending ADR ADRt+k 72.9% 64.5% 55.0% 54.3% 55.5% 47.7% 52.3% 47.8% 46.7% 44.3%
9. Return-induced IDR IDRt,t+k 72.7% 61.9% 55.2% 52.2% 54.1% 47.3% 51.4% 46.8% 45.4% 44.3%
Firm-Years in Bin 216 215 216 215 216 215 215 216 215 215
-67% -44% -28% -13% 7% 23% 39% 60% 84% 132%
1. Net debt issuing TDNIt,t+k 0.7% 2.5% 4.2% 3.3% 4.4% 9.0% 5.3% 7.7% 6.7% 13.7%
2. Net equity issuing ENIt,t+k 0.2% 0.0% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.6% 0.1% 0.6%
3. Dividends DIVt,t+k 1.5% 2.6% 2.5% 2.8% 3.1% 3.4% 3.2% 3.2% 3.3% 2.7%
4. Activist equity expansion ENIt,t+k - DIVt,t+k -1.0% -2.0% -2.0% -2.6% -2.4% -2.9% -1.9% -1.9% -2.0% -0.8%
5. Activist total expansion TDNIt,t+k + ENIt,t+k - DIVt,t+k -0.7% 0.7% 1.6% 2.1% 2.4% 6.6% 5.5% 5.9% 5.2% 14.3%
6. Induced equity growth xt,t+k * Et -26.6% -18.4% -11.5% -4.3% 2.9% 9.8% 14.2% 21.2% 31.1% 49.5%
7. Starting ADR ADRt 54.0% 51.6% 53.1% 50.4% 53.0% 49.5% 53.8% 54.0% 54.1% 58.3%
8. Ending ADR ADRt+k 77.4% 65.6% 59.9% 55.1% 55.0% 50.0% 52.1% 45.1% 42.4% 42.6%
9. Return-induced IDR IDRt,t+k 79.0% 64.2% 59.3% 52.8% 53.0% 46.9% 46.8% 44.4% 40.3% 37.8%
Firm-Years in Bin 159 159 159 159 159 159 159 160 159 159
-66% -46% -28% -7% 11% 33% 60% 85% 113% 174%
1. Net debt issuing TDNIt,t+k -0.6% 3.8% 4.8% 10.0% 15.5% 9.6% 14.6% 21.2% 19.9% 18.6%
2. Net equity issuing ENIt,t+k 0.8% 0.6% 0.1% 0.4% 0.1% 1.2% 1.2% 1.3% 4.1% 3.1%
3. Dividends DIVt,t+k 3.4% 4.0% 4.4% 5.1% 5.3% 5.3% 5.7% 6.4% 6.3% 5.7%
4. Activist equity expansion ENIt,t+k - DIVt,t+k -1.2% -2.5% -3.1% -3.7% -4.8% -2.8% -2.8% -3.6% -1.7% -1.9%
5. Activist total expansion TDNIt,t+k + ENIt,t+k - DIVt,t+k -1.1% 2.3% 1.4% 7.2% 12.8% 8.5% 8.8% 20.3% 22.9% 15.6%
6. Induced equity growth xt,t+k * Et -28.2% -16.2% -10.2% -3.1% 5.7% 12.3% 21.8% 33.6% 48.8% 67.1%
7. Starting ADR ADRt 49.4% 57.6% 56.6% 48.5% 49.6% 55.0% 56.9% 60.3% 54.0% 57.3%
8. Ending ADR ADRt+k 74.8% 67.8% 61.9% 56.9% 53.7% 49.9% 47.6% 48.8% 43.5% 38.1%
9. Return-induced IDR IDRt,t+k 76.2% 66.8% 59.0% 52.7% 47.0% 42.5% 43.3% 44.5% 37.8% 33.7%
Firm-Years in Bin 115 116 115 116 116 116 116 116 116 116
-71% -29% 2% 39% 53% 90% 95% 165% 181% 268%
1. Net debt issuing TDNIt,t+k -5.0% 8.9% 11.9% 64.2% 39.7% 50.9% 38.2% 43.9% 47.7% 36.3%
2. Net equity issuing ENIt,t+k 2.4% 4.0% 3.2% 6.6% 1.2% 7.9% 5.5% 10.9% 10.6% 0.3%
3. Dividends DIVt,t+k 8.0% 10.0% 5.8% 15.5% 14.0% 13.1% 11.7% 16.1% 18.2% 20.0%
4. Activist equity expansion ENIt,t+k - DIVt,t+k -4.4% -6.5% 0.2% -4.2% -8.3% -7.3% -4.3% -4.0% -6.4% -15.0%
5. Activist total expansion TDNIt,t+k + ENIt,t+k - DIVt,t+k -10.7% 9.5% 29.0% 59.7% 21.7% 49.7% 47.9% 49.9% 41.5% 7.3%
6. Induced equity growth xt,t+k * Et -23.0% -11.4% -3.4% 11.4% 19.4% 44.2% 39.0% 65.5% 80.6% 102.2%
7. Starting ADR ADRt 60.6% 55.8% 56.7% 53.4% 63.9% 53.4% 63.5% 53.0% 58.8% 58.6%
8. Ending ADR ADRt+k 78.4% 59.7% 63.2% 61.8% 57.9% 52.5% 52.4% 47.3% 45.1% 38.4%
9. Return-induced IDR IDRt,t+k 83.5% 62.4% 59.4% 44.3% 51.0% 33.1% 40.8% 28.3% 32.2% 25.6%
Firm-Years in Bin 45 46 45 45 45 45 46 46 46 46
Panel A: Sorted by Year, Sales and One-Year Net Stock Returns
Panel B: Sorted by Year, Sales and Three-Year Net Stock Returns
Panel C: Sorted by Year, Sales and Five-Year Net Stock Returns
Panel D: Sorted by Year, Sales and Ten-Year Net Stock Returns
Sort Criterion: Net Stock Returns xt,t+k (with k =10)
Sort Criterion: Net Stock Returns xt,t+k  (with k =1)
Sort Criterion: Net Stock Returns xt,t+k (with k =3)
Sort Criterion: Net Stock Returns xt,t+k  (with k =5)
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firms with lower returns. For instance, over the ten-year horizon firms in the upper 
return deciles expand their capital base approximately by 40%-50% (except for the best 
decile), whereas the weakest firms with regard to stock performance even contract their 
capital base by about 11%. 
The above finding that the managed capital base expansion is potentially large enough 
to counterbalance stock return-induced changes in indebtedness can now be assessed 
more differentiated: for instance, over an annual horizon the market value of equity in 
the strongest decile grows by roughly 25% due to higher stock prices, whereas the 
managed expansion of funds amounts only to approx. 3%. This relationship holds for 
the five best performing bins, while the lower performing bins show higher activist 
expansion as compared to the return-induced change in equity value. Over a ten-year 
horizon, only the three best return deciles display a higher induced equity growth than 
managed expansion.  
Rows 7 through 9 present different debt ratios and their capital structure relevance. 
Whereas starting actual debt ratios are comparatively constant across performance-
deciles for all time frames, ending actual debt ratios (      ), however, have a larger 
spread across the different stock return deciles. After one year, firms in the lowest decile 
terminate with an        of 72.9% and firms in the highest decile have a debt ratio of 
44.3%. In other words, well performing firms have lower ending debt ratios than poorly 
performing firms. Over the three-, five- and ten-year horizons this behavior reoccurs 
with the difference that starting and ending debt levels are slightly lower for all 
performance-deciles. Most interestingly, it can be seen that the starting      does not 
observably correlate with either stock returns or ending       . On the other hand, the 
return-induced equity growth (        ) is apparently a better predictor of the ending 
       than it is the starting     . For instance, the top-performing one-year decile 
shows a starting debt ratio of 55.5%, whereas both the ending        and          
amount to 44.3%. These interrelations will be further investigated by the subsequent 
regression analysis. 
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4.1.2 Regression Results 
Table 5 presents the empirical results from the estimated basic regression and, as 
outlined in subchapters 3.3 and 3.4, an adopted variant of the Fama-MacBeth regression 
type was used to estimate the coefficients   ,    and   .
30
  
 
 
Table 5: Results from the Basic Regressions
31
 
Panel A displays the regression results without an intercept and, thus, the direct relative 
impact of past leverage ratios (      and return-induced indebtedness (          on 
future actual debt ratios (        can be estimated. Over the annual horizon, the 
coefficient of          amounts 0.976 which demonstrates that the average German firm 
lets its actual debt ratio float almost completely with the experienced annual stock 
returns. This implies that a substantial proportion of the variations of the market-based 
indebtedness of firms is due to stock returns. The coefficient of the past debt 
ratio      , representing managerial rebalancing of stock returns, is only 0.027. 
Statistically this estimation is insignificantly different from zero (even at a confidence 
level of 10%). Hence, it can be interpreted that over an annual horizon managers do not 
counterbalance stock-induced changes in leverage. With increasing time horizons, 
         has a diminishing influence on the future actual debt ratio (0.891, 0.852 and 
0.486, respectively). In contrast, managerial issuing behavior has an increasingly large 
impact on the future actual debt ratio with longer observation periods. Accordingly, 
         (0.486) and      (0.536) both influence the future actual debt ratio equally 
over a ten-year horizon. Thus, both stock price changes as well as a tendency to revert 
to the previous debt ratios (induced by managerial issuing activity) determine the actual 
                                                 
30 The robustness of the Fama-MacBeth procedure proposed by Welch (2004) could be confirmed by conducting a 
pooled regression on the same panel data as underlying basis. The results can be observed in Appendix IV. 
31 The regressions are estimated with equation (3). The values in parenthesis denote Fama-MacBeth standard errors. 
Asterisks denote statistical significance at 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) levels of confidence. 
Horizon k R² T
1-year 0.976 (0.096) *** 0.027 (0.095) 0.938 22
3-year 0.891 (0.101) *** 0.114 (0.098) *** 0.814 20
5-year 0.852 (0.105) *** 0.167 (0.101) *** 0.705 18
10-year 0.486 (0.175) *** 0.539 (0.146) *** 0.531 13
1-year 0.034 (0.016) *** 0.966 (0.096) *** -0.016 (0.096) 0.943 22
3-year 0.098 (0.030) *** 0.861 (0.095) *** -0.015 (0.099) 0.844 20
5-year 0.140 (0.040) *** 0.809 (0.095) *** -0.021 (0.105) 0.765 18
10-year 0.163 (0.085) *** 0.535 (0.170) *** 0.235 (0.170) *** 0.619 13
A. Without Intercept
B. With Intercept
ADRt     IDRt,t+k c
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debt ratio. Over longer durations German firms show increasingly active financial 
management in terms of equity and debt issues, whereas in the short run the fluctuation 
in leverage can be explained to a large extent by stock price movements. In addition, it 
can be read from Table 5 that the regression model can explain roughly 94% of the 
variations of the actual debt ratio. However, the model loses its explanatory power over 
longer time periods. The coefficient of determination (  ) is almost halved over the ten 
year period (53%) as opposed to the annual horizon (94%).  
Panel B regresses          and      against        with an additional constant term 
that is incorporated to represent the relative importance of a firm´s target debt ratio 
(Welch 2004; Drobetz and Pensa 2007). When including the implicit target debt ratio in 
the regression, it can be seen that           does not lose its influence on the actual debt 
ratio. Similar to Panel A, the coefficient declines from the annual horizon of 0.966 to 
0.535 in the ten-year perspective. In contrast,      forfeits both its economic and 
statistical significance (at a confidence level of 10%) except for the ten-year period 
coefficient (0.235). The constant´s influence on a firm´s actual leverage is increasing 
with a longer observed time horizon. However, its economic influence on the actual 
debt ratio is still relatively small in comparison the coefficient of         . It could be 
assumed, that when a constant target ratio is included in the regression model, both the 
economic and statistical significance of management-induced capital readjustments 
disappear in the short-term. When, however, analyzing the ten-year period it can be 
derived, that – besides having a target leverage ratio – firms show a higher readjustment 
behavior (     coefficient of 0.235). Regarding the coefficient of determination, it can 
be observed that adding a constant target ratio as a regression intercept slightly 
increases the explanatory power of the model. This observation holds for all examined 
time horizons.  
To subsume, both panels of Table 5 indicate that          is a superior predictor of 
       than the previous actual debt ratio (     . In particular over shorter time 
horizons, a larger proportion of changes in indebtedness are caused by stock returns 
rather than active managerial rebalancing towards former leverage ratios. Those 
findings are largely in line with results obtained in the descriptive statistics over 
grouped data (subchapter 4.1.1). 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
41 
 
4.1.3 Decomposition of Capital Structure Determinants 
The previous regressions have been conducted with the actual debt ratio (      ) as 
dependent variable and the initial debt ratio (    ) as well as the implied debt ratio 
(        ) as explanatory variables.
32
 In addition, following Welch´s (2004) approach, 
the subsequent regression can be viewed as a complement to the regressions performed 
in the preceding subchapter in two ways. First, it decomposes the dynamic capital 
structure elements by describing the respective power of explaining        by different 
variables: all issuing and dividend activity, all issuing activity, net equity issuing 
activity and net debt issuing activity in addition to the initial actual debt ratio and the 
implied debt ratio. Second, the complementary regression does not only focus on levels 
of different variables, but also describes the power of explaining changes in the future 
actual debt ratio (Welch 2004; Drobetz and Pensa 2007). All other variables are 
excluded so that only the linear relationship between        and the respective 
explaining variable is examined. For instance, it can be explained how a change in the 
actual debt ratio over a one year horizon can be explained by all issuing activity.  
Table 6 reports the average coefficients of determination (  ) which were obtained by 
using the previously described Fama-MacBeth regression procedure.
33
 When 
contrasting the past actual debt ratio with the future actual debt ratio, it can be read from 
the first row that      has an explanatory power of roughly 85% over an annual 
horizon and    significantly decreases to about 42% over a period of five years. In 
comparison, stock return influences (        ) have a higher explanatory power over 
both horizons; though over five years          wins the horse race against      since it 
remains at a    of 76.2%. Moreover, the explanatory power of the implied debt ratio is 
higher than the remaining observed variables (row 3 to 6) over both time horizons 
(annual and five years). Nevertheless, over an annual horizon, all capital issuing-related 
variables have high levels of    (between 84% and 88%).  
                                                 
32 Additionally, for testing for an implicit target debt ratio, a constant has been added for one part of the regressions.  
33 Regression coefficients, standard errors and t-statistics are not reported since they are not the object of interest 
under the given circumstances.  
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Table 6: Explanatory Power of Capital Structure Determinants
34
 
Additionally, the findings on capital structure dynamics can be examined from the 
changes of the actual debt ratio with regard to the listed variables. Annually, changes in 
a firm´s actual debt ratio can be explained to almost two thirds (62.7%) by changes in 
stock prices, whereas all issuing activity (excluding dividend payments) can only 
explain about one third of debt ratio changes (32.9%). This finding is in line with 
previous regression results that the return-induced changes dominate German firms´ 
capital structures in the short-term. Additionally, the change regression also confirms 
that managers increasingly engage in active financial management over a longer time 
frame (five years). Hence, the explanatory power of          is strongly reduced to 
roughly 18%, while the mean    for all issuing activities is reduced to a lesser extent. 
Put differently, over an annual horizon German firms could potentially offset half of the 
stock return-induced capital structure changes (32.9% versus 62.7%) and, within five 
years, they might be able to completely counterbalance any return-induced capital 
structure fluctuations (21.0% versus 17.6%). However, as analyzed in the previous basic 
regression, it is seen that, except for the ten year period, the coefficients of      have − 
at most − moderate magnitudes. Thus, even if corporate issuing activity has 
theoretically solid explanatory power of actual capital structures in Germany, the 
influence on the actual capital structure in negligible in the short-term.  
Finally, if the overall issuing activity is distinguished by equity and debt issuing, a 
significant difference can be noticed: debt issues in the German sample can explain 
about six times (30.4%) more changes in capital structure than equity issues (5.6%). 
Over a five year horizon this finding is becoming less pronounced; net equity issuing 
                                                 
34 The reported values are Fama-MacBeth coefficients of determination calculated in accordance with equation (18). 
For levels estimations, the dependent variable is        and independent variables are defined as follows: row 1: 
equation (4); row 2: equation (5); row 3: equation (12); row 4: equation (13); row 5: equation (14); row 6: equation 
(15). For changes estimations, the dependent variable is              and      is deducted from the 
independent variables as defined for the levels estimations.  
Levels (%) Changes (%) Levels (%) Changes (%)
1. Past debt ratio 85.3 - 41.9 -
2. Implied debt ratio 94.1 62.7 76.2 17.6
3. All issuing and dividend activity 88.3 29.4 57.1 16.8
4. All issuing activity 88.4 32.9 55.9 21.0
5. Net equity issuing activity 84.4 5.6 48.2 7.2
6. Net debt issuing activity 89.7 30.4 50.6 14.5
k = 1 Year
Mean R
2
k = 5 Years
Mean R
2
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activity only increases slightly to 7.2%, whereas the explanatory power of debt 
issuances decreases to 14.5%. 
4.1.4 Comparison to Referential Studies 
The regression coefficients of the German sample can be put in contrast to the U.S. and 
European samples. Generally speaking, it can be stated that the empirical results on the 
German sample can be located between the ones from the U.S. and the European sample 
with regard to their readjustment behavior as follows:  
First, in terms of stock return-induced capital structure changes (indicated by         ), 
it is observed that leverage ratios of German firms are less influenced by changes in 
stock prices than U.S. corporations over all investigated time horizons. The spread 
increased over the ten-year period (0.486 in Germany; 0.683 in the U.S.). This pattern 
also holds for the models with and without intercepts. On the other hand, in comparison 
to the consolidated European sample, German public firms show a higher co-movement 
between stock prices and their respective capital structures across all analyzed time 
horizons and irrespective of the inclusion of a constant term.  
Second, contrasting the active capital structure management (indicated by       ) of 
the average German company to the U.S. and European samples, it is again observable 
that German firms represent a mingle between both referential samples. Across all 
considered time horizons (except three years without a constant), German firms are 
more engaged in active financial management than U.S. firms, which is most 
pronounced over the ten-year period. However, not only the isolated average German 
firm, but also the average European firm puts more attention on counterbalancing stock-
induced capital structure changes by issuing activity than in the U.S. 
Third, it can be observed that for the consolidated European as well as for the U.S. 
sample the explanatory power (  ) of variances in leverage ratios by the regression 
model with the intercept is lower than by the one without the constant term. In contrast, 
the regression model of the German sample has a higher explanatory power with the 
intercept.  
Fourth, in Welch´s (2004) analysis of the U.S. sample, changes in debt ratios can be 
explained to a larger extent by changes in net issuing activities than by changes in stock 
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returns. Therefore, he concludes that sufficient capital structure-relevant corporate 
issuing activity potentially exists to even out return-induced equity growth. Drobetz and 
Pensa (2007) follow the same argumentation for their European sample. However, in 
the European sample corporate issuing is only large enough to potentially counteract 
half of the return-induced changes in leverage. The same holds for the German sample 
over the annual horizon (see Table 6), whereas over a five year period the average 
German firm could potentially counteract 100% of debt ratio changes due to changes in 
market values of equity (as in the U.S. sample). 
4.2 Life-Cycle Analysis 
4.2.1 Descriptive Statistics on Subsamples 
When clustering the German sample according to the comparative maturity of firms (as 
outlined in subchapter 3.5) it can be derived from Panel A1 and A2 of Table 7 that firms 
in the more mature subsample are on average (mean) approximately three times larger 
as their comparatively less mature German peers; both in terms of market and book 
values (i.e. total accounting assets). In respect of one-year sales and operating income, 
the mature subsample is roughly three and four times larger, respectively. With regard 
to market-based indebtedness (     , both maturity-related show about the same 
leverage (mature 49.0%, immature 51.8%) However, comparing Panel B1 and B2, firms 
in the immature subsample tend to issue more (less) equity (debt) than more mature 
firms over an annual horizon. This tendency is even more pronounced over the three, 
five year and ten-year horizons.
35
  
                                                 
35 Results for the ten-year period are not reported since the small sample size (due to the clustering according to the 
degree of maturity) causes high standard errors and statistical insignificance in the subsequent regressions. 
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Table 7: Descriptive Statistics – Life-Cycle Subsamples 
Overall, firms in the immature subsample engage in higher managed expansion (one 
year: 3.3%; five years: 24.5%) than firms in the mature subsample (one year: 2.6%; five 
years: 17.0%). In addition, the mature subsample experiences a higher return-induced 
equity growth throughout all horizons with increasing significance in the long-term. For 
instance, the mean induced equity growth for the mature subsample amounts to 26.2% 
over the five year horizon, whereas the immature subsample only obtains an induced 
equity growth of 21.8%.  
In addition, a modified Altman (1968) Z-score is reported in Table 7 as an indicator of 
the ex ante probability of financial distress.
36
 As expected, the more mature subsample 
has a higher mean score (2.04) than the less mature subsample (1.54) which indicates a 
higher probability of bankruptcy for the latter.  
                                                 
36 See Appendix II for an explanation regarding the modification of the original Altman (1968) Z-Score. 
Description Abreviation Mean Median
Standard 
Deviation
Variation 
Coefficient Mean Median
Standard 
Deviation
Variation 
Coefficient Mean Median
Standard 
Deviation
Variation 
Coefficient
1. Actual Debt Ratio ADRt 49.0 50.8 23.3 0.5
2. Implied Debt Ratio IDRt,t+k 48.9 50.2 23.8 0.5 47.8 47.8 24.2 0.5 45.8 45.5 24.1 0.5
3. Market Value Et+Dt 18,289 2,178 41,460 2.3
4. Total accounting assets At 14,969 1,371 37,082 2.5
5. Sales St 11,659 1,646 26,664 2.3
6. Operating Income Pt 521 61 1,438 2.8
7. Modified Altman Z-Score Zt 2.04 2.11 2.18 1.1
1. Actual Debt Ratio ADRt 51.8 54.8 24.4 0.5
2. Implied Debt Ratio IDRt,t+k 52.4 54.9 25.1 0.5 52.6 54.6 25.5 0.5 51.9 54.1 25.2 0.5
3. Market Value Et+Dt 6,047 855 19,693 3.3
4. Total accounting assets At 4,854 652 15,627 3.2
5. Sales St 4,144 639 10,759 2.6
6. Operating Income Pt 128 9,041 771 6.0
7. Modified Altman Z-Score Zt 1.54 1.58 1.25 0.8
1. Net debt issuing TDNIt,t+k 3.3 1.9 12.9 3.9 11.2 6.5 28.7 2.6 19.8 12.9 41.3 2.1
2. Net equity issuing before dividends ENIt,t+k 0.7 0.0 4.4 6.7 2.0 0.0 8.8 4.4 4.0 0.3 15.1 3.7
3. Debt and equity issuing TDNIt,t+k + ENIt,t+k 3.9 2.0 14.6 3.7 13.2 7.1 32.4 2.5 23.9 13.8 49.5 2.1
4. Dividends DIVt,t+k 1.3 1.0 1.2 0.9 4.1 3.3 3.4 0.8 7.3 5.8 6.2 0.8
5. Activist equity expansion ENIt,t+k - DIVt,t+k -0.6 -0.9 4.7 -7.3 -2.1 -2.8 9.7 -4.5 -3.2 -4.4 16.9 -5.2
6. Activist total expansion TDNIt,t+k + ENIt,t+k - DIVt,t+k 2.6 0.7 14.8 5.6 9.0 3.2 32.6 3.6 17.0 6.6 50.3 3.0
7. Total euro return rt,t+k * Et 5.8 3.0 23.5 4.0 19.7 8.8 51.0 2.6 35.4 20.4 76.3 2.2
8. Induced equity growth xt,t+k * Et 4.2 1.7 23.3 5.5 14.5 5.5 49.4 3.4 26.2 13.7 72.5 2.8
1. Net debt issuing TDNIt,t+k 2.4 1.1 15.0 6.3 10.4 3.7 37.7 27.5 18.4 10.4 47.0 2.6
2. Net equity issuing before dividends ENIt,t+k 1.8 0.0 6.2 3.5 6.1 0.2 15.7 39.0 10.0 1.5 21.9 2.2
3. Debt and equity issuing TDNIt,t+k + ENIt,t+k 4.4 1.6 18.5 4.2 17.4 7.3 47.5 36.6 30.4 17.7 65.4 2.2
4. Dividends DIVt,t+k 0.9 0.5 1.3 1.4 2.9 2.3 3.3 89.6 5.4 4.4 5.4 1.0
5. Activist equity expansion ENIt,t+k - DIVt,t+k 0.9 -0.3 6.5 7.6 3.2 -1.0 16.4 19.5 4.5 -1.4 23.1 5.2
6. Activist total expansion TDNIt,t+k + ENIt,t+k - DIVt,t+k 3.3 0.8 18.2 5.5 13.6 4.4 46.2 29.5 24.5 11.4 65.8 2.7
7. Total euro return rt,t+k * Et 3.4 0.6 26.5 7.8 15.2 4.2 57.3 26.6 28.9 9.8 87.9 3.0
8. Induced equity growth xt,t+k * Et 2.1 -0.5 26.3 12.5 11.2 0.7 55.9 20.0 21.8 4.7 84.9 3.9
Panel A1: Mature Firm Capital Structure Ratios (%) and Firm Size, Sales and Operating Income
Panel B1: Mature Firm Issuing Activities (%), normalized by Market Value (D+E) and Winsorized (%)
Panel A2: Immature Firm Capital Structure Ratios (%) and Firm Size, Sales and Operating Income
Panel B2: Immature Firm Issuing Activities (%), normalized by Market Value (D+E) and Winsorized (%)
One-Year Three-Year Five-Year
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4.2.2 Regression Results 
Table 8 presents the regression results for the two subsamples: Panel A1 and B1 depict 
the results for the mature subsample and Panel A2 and B2 outline the findings for 
relatively less mature firms without and including a constant term, respectively.  
Panel A1 shows that the average German firm in the mature subsample engages in low 
readjustment over annual horizons (     coefficient of 0.085). With increasing time 
frames, the management-induced rebalancing activity of stock returns enhances and, 
consequently, considerable readjustment activity over three (0.201) and five-year 
(0.265) time frames can be observed. The amplification of adjustment activity is, 
however, more pronounced from annual to three-year time frames as compared to the 
increase from the three-year to the five-year horizon. Accordingly, the impact of return-
induced changes of market-based leverage (          reduces from 0.922 (one-year) to 
0.765 (five-year).  
 
 
Table 8: Regressions Results on the Life-Cycle Subsamples
37
 
Investigating the rebalancing behavior of comparatively immature German firms (Panel 
A2) yields that, over annual horizons, the average firm essentially fulfills Welch´s 
(2004) “perfect non-readjustment” hypothesis presented in subchapter 3.4:      has no 
significant impact on the debt ratio one year into the future (      ). Despite the fact 
that the importance of past debt ratios increases over three and five-year time frames, in 
                                                 
37 The regressions are estimated with equation (19) and equation (20), respectively. The values in parenthesis denote 
Fama-MacBeth standard errors. Asterisks denote statistical significance at 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) levels of 
confidence. 
Horizon k R² T
1-year 0.922 (0.132) *** 0.085 (0.130) *** 0.942 22
3-year 0.812 (0.136) *** 0.201 (0.128) *** 0.874 20
5-year 0.765 (0.167) *** 0.265 (0.148) *** 0.780 18
1-year 1.007 (0.133) *** -0.005 (0.133) 0.935 22
3-year 0.937 (0.152) *** 0.056 (0.153) * 0.758 20
5-year 0.915 (0.163) *** 0.087 (0.164) ** 0.628 18
1-year 0.026 (0.026) *** 0.924 (0.137) *** 0.039 (0.140) 0.947 22
3-year 0.043 (0.043) *** 0.789 (0.136) *** 0.148 (0.146) *** 0.888 20
5-year 0.064 (0.060) *** 0.733 (0.180) *** 0.179 (0.192) *** 0.807 18
1-year 0.077 (0.024) *** 0.944 (0.136) *** -0.039 (0.134) 0.941 22
3-year 0.128 (0.049) *** 0.868 (0.142) *** -0.079 (0.150) ** 0.815 20
5-year 0.190 (0.062) *** 0.848 (0.140) *** -0.152 (0.160) *** 0.740 18
Panel A2. Immature Subsample - Without Intercept
Panel B2. Immature Subsample - With Intercept
Panel A1. Mature Subsample - Without Intercept
Panel B1. Mature Subsample - With Intercept
c     IDRt,t+k  ADRt 
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comparison to the mature subsample, the absolute importance remains on a low level 
(0.056 and 0.087, respectively). Consequently, return-induced changes retain a strong 
impact on the capital structures of immature companies as the corresponding coefficient 
remains above 0.90 and higher than the corresponding value in the mature subsample 
over all examined periods.  
In accordance with the approach from subchapter 4.1.2, all regressions are also 
performed including a constant term to represent the importance of target debt ratios 
(Panel B1 and B2). The coefficient for the constant term ranges between 0.026 and 
0.064 for the mature subsample. Moreover, both the impact of          and      on 
       decrease, but retain economic and statistical significance (except for      over 
one year). In contrast, the inclusion of a constant term for immature firms (Panel B2) 
causes, on the one hand,      to lose any positive impact on future actual debt ratios.
38
 
On the other hand, the impact of stock returns is also reduced, but still has a 
considerable impact. As compared to the mature subsample, the constant term itself has 
a relatively large coefficient that, in addition, considerably increases over time (from 
0.077 for one year to 0.19 for five years). 
With regard to    of the regression models, both the mature and the immature 
subsamples show that the model that includes a constant term has a somewhat higher 
explanatory power than the one without such term over all time horizons. In addition, 
the model on the mature subsample shows a higher explanatory power than the one for 
the immature subsample. 
  
                                                 
38 In fact,      remains statistically significant and has a negative impact on       . However, Welch´s (2004) 
stark hypothesis only considers coefficients with values between 0 and 1. 
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5 DISCUSSION 
5.1 General Discussion 
By and large, the preceding empirical findings confirm Welch´s (2004) as well as 
Drobetz and Pensa´s (2007) findings of managerial inactivity to promptly and 
completely rebalance return-induced changes in the market-based capital structures. 
Correspondingly, Graham and Harvey (2001) find in their survey-based research that 
U.S. financial executives do not issue debt in accordance with changes in stock prices.  
As outlined in subchapter 4.1.4, the results from the isolated German stock market can 
be located roughly halfway between, on the one side, the U.S. market and, on the other 
side, the averaged European market. This implies that Welch´s (2004) observations also 
hold for different institutional settings with different legal and economic backgrounds 
and, therefore, allows for a certain generalization of the findings. Thus, the initial 
statement, that the German and U.S. institutional settings were “two polar extremes” 
(Allen and Gale 1995, 179), does not appear to hold for corporate rebalancing activity 
which gives rise to the question on the underlying reasons for such similar results:  
To begin with, the fact that German firms engage in a similar degree of (non-) 
rebalancing as compared to their American peers has to be put into perspective: in light 
of the fact that the mean stock returns in Germany are comparatively lower than in the 
U.S. (see subchapter 4.1.4), the return-induced deviations from starting capital 
structures are less pronounced in the German sample. For that reason, readjustment of 
the comparatively smaller deviations is easier for managers in German firms because 
equivalent readjustment activities have a higher impact on actual debt ratios (      ) 
and, consistently, German firms issue less capital (both debt and equity) in comparison 
to the U.S. (as afore-mentioned in subchapter 4.1.4). In other words, managerial 
inactivity has lower impacts on market-based leverage ratios.  
In addition, the possibility that the well-acknowledged diverging financial market 
features between the U.S. and Germany hardly have an impact on managerial 
readjustment behavior studied in this thesis has to be taken into consideration. Thus, for 
instance, the different degrees of dispersion of corporate ownership structures would be 
argued not to impact managerial rebalancing. A potential explanation for the similar 
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observations in two distinctly different institutional settings may also be that the 
counterbalancing of return-inducted changes in leverage can be seen to be impacted by 
individual behavioral aspects of corporate managers (Shefrin 2005, 92ff). Nevertheless, 
the differentiation between the German bank-based system on the one hand and the U.S. 
market-based system on the other hand still appears to be relevant (see subchapter 1.2). 
For instance, the relatively higher importance of debt issues compared to equity issues 
in the German market could be confirmed: debt issues can explain about six times 
(30.4%) more changes in capital structure than equity issues (5.6%) over the annual 
horizon (see Table 6). In addition, as stated in subchapter 4.1.1, the average German 
firm is considerably more levered than the mean U.S. firm from Welch´s (2004) sample 
(     equals 50% versus 30%). 
Having placed the obtained results in an institutional framework, the empirical findings 
from this thesis can be reconciled with the standard capital structure theories (as 
presented in subchapter 2.2): 
Trade-off theory: The observation that, in particular over short time horizons, German 
firms allow their market-based capital structures to significantly fluctuate with stock 
returns may imply that optimal leverage ratios, as indicated by the trade-off theory, are 
not followed by German corporate managers. In addition, the comparatively weak 
coefficient of the constant term of 0.163 over the ten-year time frame (see Table 5) does 
not necessarily correspond with the predictions from the trade-off theory and, neither, 
with the afore-mentioned finding by Graham and Harvey (2001) that more than two 
thirds of U.S. American CFOs aim for, to some extent, fixed target debt ratios. 
Moreover, in line with the observations by Fama and French (2002), no direct linear 
relationship between firm performance and leverage (    ) can be observed (see Table 
4). This conflicts with the trade-off theory prediction of a positive relation between firm 
performance and leverage.
39
  
Pecking order theory: German firms are identified to issue both less equity and debt 
compared to U.S. firms and the European average. Assuming that German firms 
experience a similar degree of capital expansion as their international peers, funding 
from internal funds could be presumed. Accordingly, German firms can be observed to 
                                                 
39 Here, a positive relation between profitability, which facilitates tax shield gains, and stock return performance is 
assumed.  
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grant lower dividends than their U.S. peer (average over five years: Germany 6.4%, 
U.S. 11.9%). In addition to the described potential internal financing policy, as also 
indicated in Table 3, German corporations apparently prefer debt over equity financing. 
Both of these behaviors can be seen to be in accordance with Myers´ (1984) pecking 
order theory. In addition, low dividend payments may be correlated with the fact that 
banks – which are often major shareholders of German firms – do not appreciate 
dividend payouts since they may diminish cash debt servicing capacities. Furthermore, 
the fact that German firms show a low dispersion of shareholders may promote the 
assumed higher internal financing activity (La Porta et al. 1996). 
Market timing theory: As depicted in Table 4, increasing (decreasing) stock returns 
trigger higher (lower) stock issuing and, thus, German managers do not react 
counteractively to stock price developments in their issuing policy in order to maintain a 
target leverage ratio, which is supported in the basic regression model (see Table 5). 
These observations, on the one hand, may imply managerial inertia in readjusting to 
initial leverage ratios. On the other hand, it may as well suggest that managers try to 
time the equity market as proposed by Baker and Wurgler (2002). This underlines the 
earlier argument that managerial inertia towards rebalancing activity and market timing 
efforts are not necessarily mutually exclusive, but can even support each other (see 
subchapter 2.2.4 and 2.4). 
Finally, the inevitable question remains why, after all, managers engage in such little 
rebalancing activity: Graham and Harvey (2001) detect that executives attach the 
highest importance to credit rating implications and future financial flexibility when 
taking debt issue decisions. In this context, it appears rational that executives refrain 
from debt-based rebalancing in case of stock price increases if this would put these two 
factors at risk. In addition, they find that share price increases are strongly considered 
for equity issues which supports the idea of market-timing.  
Interestingly, Graham and Harvey (2001) also find that financial executives affirm the 
idea of a value-based assessment of projects (e.g. capital budgeting), but are less 
probable to deem academically determined theories on corporate capital structures as 
meaningful. In view of the fact that the WACC, which is a main driver behind any 
value-based approach, is strongly impacted by the market-based leverage ratio of a firm, 
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the potential argument that executives are rather concerned with book value 
indebtedness appears to be contradictory. 
In addition, changes in the composition of corporate value (assets in place as opposed to 
growth opportunities; see subchapter 2.3) can be related to managerial rebalancing: 
assuming that, on the one hand, growth opportunities and idiosyncratic risk and, on the 
other hand, growth opportunities and stock market valuations are positively correlated, 
it may be argued that a lower leverage ratio goes along with increasing stock prices in 
order to balance the enhanced firm-specific risk (Myers 1977; Hovakimian 2006). From 
this perspective, a low degree of management-induced rebalancing may appear rational 
as well. 
Moreover, the impact of adjustment costs on corporate readjustment decisions has to be 
considered in this respect. As discussed in subchapter 2.4, Leary and Roberts (2005) 
contend that market-based indebtedness is strongly impacted by preceding stock returns 
due to managerial optimization efforts of adjustment costs; rather than managerial 
inertia. This result can be argued to match the findings in this thesis in the sense that 
companies do engage in readjustment activity in the long-term, but short-term actual 
debt ratio volatilities are largely accepted. However, Welch´s (2004) standard model 
does not allow for a differentiation between inertia (or indifference towards leverage 
fluctuations) and optimization efforts due to costly adjustment transactions. 
Consequently, a supplementary model is set up in order to test the readjustment 
behavior of firms that can be assumed to face higher adjustment costs caused by the 
issuance of debt.
40
 In some support of Leary and Roberts´ (2005) findings, Table A2 
(see Appendix II) depicts that firms with comparatively lower adjustment costs engage 
in higher rebalancing (systematically higher coefficient for      and lower coefficient 
for         ) of return-induced changes in leverage than firms with more costly 
adjustment efforts. However, the results are less pronounced than the ones by Leary and 
Roberts (2005) and the differences between the two subsamples (sorted by differing 
adjustment costs) are not substantial. Because the German sample firms rather rely on 
debt issuances (see Table 3), the fact that the model on adjustment costs covered in this 
thesis does not include equity-related costs can be expected to have diminished impact 
                                                 
40 See Appendix II for a presentation of the complementary model on the relationship of rebalancing activity and 
adjustment cost. In view of the fact that this model goes beyond the initial research objectives of this thesis, no 
additional subchapters were devoted to an in-depth presentation of the empirical results. 
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on the results. It may be concluded from the findings in Appendix II that the managerial 
passivity regarding leverage readjustment cannot entirely be explained by adjustment 
cost implications. In this context, Graham and Harvey´s (2001) findings that American 
financial executives typically do not judge transaction costs to be decisive when taking 
debt-financing decisions seems to be matching. Interestingly, target debt ratios appear to 
be more important for companies with higher debt adjustment costs (see Table A2; 
higher coefficient for the constant term over all time horizons), which may be attributed 
to stricter covenants in debt contracts for less credit-worthy firms.  
5.2 Life-Cycle Discussion 
The aforementioned theories on corporate life-cycles (see subchapter 2.3) postulated 
different financing patterns with regard to a firm´s respective maturity. According to the 
obtained results (see Table 7), it can be observed that comparatively immature firms 
tend to issue more equity, whereas firms in the mature subsample are more likely to 
issue debt. An underlying reason for this finding may be the fact that more mature firms 
have lower business risk and, therefore, those companies can use more debt, as opposed 
to younger firms that reduce financial risk associated with debt in order to offset the 
relatively larger business risk (Damodaran 2001, 511ff; Hovakimian, Opler, and Titman 
2001). This reasoning is also supported by the fact that the more mature subsample has 
a higher average Z-score (see Table 7).
41
 Yet, the diverging financing behavior is not 
reflected in observed actual debt ratios (    ) 
The regression findings show that for more mature firms target debt ratios are less 
pronounced (see Table 8). This result can be argued to contradict empirical findings by 
Graham and Harvey (2001, 211) who claim that “large firms are more likely to have 
target debt ratios: 55% of large firms have at least somewhat strict target ratios, 
compared to 36% of small firms.” However, these authors base their clustering pattern 
on size, which is only one of various determinants of a firm´s degree of maturity which 
was used to cluster firms in this thesis. A potential explanation for the opposing 
observation in this study might be the fact that more mature firms have a stronger 
financial base and do not face the same external pressure on their financing policies (i.e. 
                                                 
41 The fact, that a company’s credit quality impacts its financings decisions is also reflected in Table A1(Appendix 
II): firms that have a comparatively inferior (superior) credit quality tend to issue more equity (debt) than the 
reference firms. 
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credit agencies). Immature firms may have higher external financial obligations and, 
hence, comply more intensively to target debt ratios.  
Moreover, this thesis has identified that immature firms show a lower tendency to adjust 
capital structure changes caused by stock price shocks with managerial issuing activity 
(i.e. lower coefficient for      over all time horizons, see Table 8).
42
 This is observed 
despite the fact that the less mature firms face lower stock returns that have to be 
counterbalanced (see Table 7). Accordingly, it was also found that immature firms tend 
to let their market-based capital ratios float more with stock price changes (i.e. higher 
coefficient for         ) than firms in the comparatively more established subsample. 
This is in line with Fischer, Heinkel, and Zechner´s (1989) finding that riskier and 
smaller firms experience comparatively larger fluctuations in their leverage ratios. 
Assuming a positive correlation between firm size and maturity (also indicated in Table 
7, Panel A1 and A2), different degrees of adjustment costs may explain why immature 
firms display less adjustment behavior: Huang and Ritter (2009) refer to Leary and 
Roberts´ (2005) classification of adjustment costs into fixed, proportional, and fixed 
cost plus a convex cost components and put forward that due to the fixed component 
(e.g. fixed costs per bond issue) it can be argued that larger firms face relatively lower 
adjustment costs when rebalancing their leverage ratio than smaller firms.  
Using a modified Altman (1968) Z-score as a proxy for debt issuance cost, it can be 
stated that the mature subsample has on average lower adjustment costs in this sense 
(see Table 7; mean Z-score: 2.04); whereas the immature subsample seems to have 
higher adjustment costs when issuing debt (mean Z-score: 1.54). In accordance with the 
previous discussion on Leary and Roberts´ (2005) findings on the impact of adjustment 
costs (see subchapter 2.4), it appears reasonable that firms from the relatively immature 
subsample are likely to engage in less adjustment behavior due to higher adjustment 
costs (debt issuing costs). However, as above-mentioned, a strong impact of adjustment 
costs could not be confirmed in the German sample (see Appendix II). Thus, differing 
cost implications of adjustment certainly play a role in explaining the differing behavior 
between the two maturity-related subsamples, but additional unidentified determinants 
                                                 
42 It can be observed that more immature firms tend to issue more equity than mature firms (Table 7). However, since 
the average stock return are positive across all samples, equity appears not to be an appropriate measure of 
rebalancing, and instead, a means of growth realization for comparatively immature firms. 
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can be expected to also cause comparatively lesser adjustment behavior by relatively 
immature companies. 
With reference to the agency theory (see Jensen and Meckling 1976; Myers 1977), 
another argument can be brought forward to explain why immature firms engage in less 
rebalancing: immature firms experience higher growth opportunities and, therefore, they 
can be expected to be increasingly confronted with debt overhang problems as opposed 
to their mature peers (which rather have assets in place than growth opportunities). 
Thus, large amounts of debt could prevent relatively immature firms from realizing 
valuable growth oppotunites (i.e. positive-NPV projects). Additionally, Rajan and 
Zingales (1995) argue that the existence of tangible assets reduces agency costs of debt. 
Consequently, in view of the fact that mature firms can be expected to have a larger 
capital base, they are enabled to pursue higher rebalancing activity of stock prices 
appreciations using debt.  
Damodaran (2001, 511ff) as well as Hovakimian, Opler, and Titman (2001) argue that 
the higher business risk of less mature ventures at early stages results in lower debt 
capacity, which was also identified in the above discussion on the differing issuing 
activiy. Derived from this fact, comparatively immature firms have a lower ability to 
issue debt in order to counteract leverage reductions caused by increasing stock prices. 
In addition, it may be argued that less mature firms even appreciate declines in 
levergage due to stock price increases because the finacial risk is reduced accordingly, 
which can balance higher business risk.  
Miller and Friesen (1984) put forward that firms with different maturities differ in their 
organizatinal structure, decision-making process and strategic focuses: less mature firms 
are found to have more centralized structures and decision authorities than their more 
mature peers. Thus, from an organizational perspective, more mature firms can be 
argued to have increased managerial resources to engage in corporate rebalancing, 
whereas executive managers of comparatively unestablished firms can be asssumed to 
rather be concerned with the development of a favourable strategic market position.  
Finally, by clustering the German sample into the two subsamples focusing on corporate 
maturity, it can be observed that    slightly loses its explanatory power when 
considering less mature firms. The question arises if Welch´s (2004) model holds better 
for considerably less mature than the ones observed in this thesis.  
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6 CONCLUSION 
6.1 Main Findings 
This thesis has been conducted in order to investigate in the empirical relationship 
between stock returns and market-based capital structures. Here, the research objectives 
have been twofold: first, it has been examined if German public companies adjust debt 
ratios manually in response to equity price shocks. Second, German firms were 
clustered according to their comparative maturity in order to analyse potentially 
different readjustment behaviours at diverging corporate life-cycle phases.  
Generally, even if the German and U.S. financial corporations display different 
financing patterns derived from historical origins, this thesis found that corporate 
rebalancing behaviour is surprisingly similar in both markets. The obtained results 
imply that Welch´s (2004) finding of low managerial rebalancing also holds for entirely 
diverging institutional settings and, therefore, equity prices have a strong impact on 
German firms´ capital structures. In the long-run management-induced rebalancing 
activities increase. Interestingly, this thesis found that German firms´ rebalancing 
behaviour bridges the European and the U.S. markets. In other words, even if the 
German capital market presents somewhat an inverse of the U.S. peer, apparently it has 
more in common with the U.S. market than other European capital markets.  
Nevertheless, it was argued that the finding of low managerial readjustment does not 
allow for explicit conclusions on the underlying motivations for this behaviour. Inter 
alia, managerial inertia (Welch 2004), equity market timing (Baker and Wurgler 2002) 
and adjustment costs (Leary and Roberts 2005) can be seen to cause the empirical 
findings. To further investigate this issue, it was tested if adjustment costs play a vital 
role as argued by Leary and Roberts (2005). Here, partial support for the argument that 
adjustment costs hinder immediate corporate rebalancing activity was found. However, 
other factors beyond adjustment costs must also have a restricting influence on 
managerial rebalancing of German corporations.  
The life-cycle extension of Welch´s (2004) work could identify different corporate 
issuing behaviours when either mature or immature firms are analysed. It was found 
that more mature firms engage comparatively more in counterbalancing capital issuing 
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activities and similarly do not let their market-based capital structure co-move as much 
as immature firms do. To some extent this difference in issuing behaviour could be 
explained due to different levels of adjustment costs which mature and immature firms 
experience. However, again, as concluded for the first research objective, differences in 
adjustment costs can only explain part of the issuing behaviour differences between 
both maturity subsamples. 
Myers (1984, 575) raised the question of “how […] firms choose their capital 
structures” and concluded that “we don't know”. The results from this thesis suggest 
that, in the short run, German firms do not choose their capital structure deliberately, 
but accept return-induced capital structures. In the long run they gradually engage in 
rebalancing in order to revert to initial market-based capital structures. 
6.2 Limitations 
The sample data underlying this thesis is limited to companies that were listed in one of 
the main German stock indices DAX, MDAX, SDAX and TecDAX in the period 
between 1990 and 2012. Despite the fact that this large sample can be expected to cover 
a large variety of firms, any conclusions drawn in this thesis are based to this specific 
sample and may not directly be applied to the entirety of German companies (out-of-
sample robustness). In particular, the vast amount of German small and medium-sized 
businesses, which are frequently not publicly listed, is not covered in this thesis.  
With regard to the life-cycle extension of this thesis, it has to be pointed out that, 
although every firm is clustered into subsamples regarding their comparative maturity, 
all sample firms are public listed corporations from major stock indices. Therefore, a 
relatively high average level of maturity across the entire sample has to be assumed. 
Arguably, firms listed on the TecDAX may pose an exception from this assumption. 
6.3 Further Research 
The subject covered in this thesis appears to offer a variety of future research 
opportunities. For instance, the relationship between readjustment behavior, managerial 
inertia and adjustment costs could be analyzed in a more comprehensive way in order to 
reduce the ambiguity regarding the underlying reasons for managerial passivity about 
short-term rebalancing. Whereas this thesis used debt issuance costs as proxy for 
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adjustment costs, it would be worthwhile to examine whether other cost components 
(e.g. equity issuance related costs) have additional influence on corporate issuing 
behavior and hence, could explain the low readjustment policy German firms pursue at 
least in the short run.  
In terms of the life-cycle extension, it will be relevant to analyze a larger company 
sample with more diverging degrees of maturity among the observed firms. As afore-
mentioned, this thesis rather observed relatively mature firms and a larger heterogeneity 
of firms will allow a more differentiated analysis. Trends detected in the results from 
this thesis can be assumed to be more pronounced in such an analysis. In addition, the 
robustness of the results on the rebalancing behavior of firms at different life-cycle 
stages can be tested in different institutional settings. 
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Appendix I – Variable Explanations 
Datastream Item Datastream Description Variable 
Common Dividends 
(WC05376) 
Common Dividends represent the total cash common 
dividends paid on the company´s common stock during the 
fiscal year, including extra and special dividends. 
    
Common Equity 
(WC03501) 
Common Equity represents common shareholders´ 
investment in a company. 
It includes but is not restricted to: Common stock value, 
Retained earnings, Capital surplus, Capital stock premium 
   
Common Shares 
Outstanding 
(W05301) 
Common Shares Outstanding represents the number of 
shares outstanding at the company´s year end. It is the 
difference between issued shares and treasury shares. 
see   
Earnings Before Interest 
And Taxes  
(WC18191) 
Earnings Before Interest And Taxes (EBIT) represent the 
earnings of a company before interest expense and income 
taxes. It is calculated by taking the pretax income and 
adding back interest expense on debt and subtracting 
interest capitalized 
     
Market Capitalization 
(WC08001) 
Market Price-Year End times Common Shares Outstanding 
  
Market Price  
Year End 
(W05001) 
Market Price - Year End represents the closing price of the 
company´s stock at December 31 for U.S. Corporations. 
For non-U.S. corporations, this item represents the closing 
price of the company´s stock at their fiscal year end. 
see   
Net Sales/ Revenues 
(WC01001) 
Net Sales or Revenues represent gross sales and other 
operating revenue less discounts, returns and allowances.   
Operating Income 
(WC01250) 
Operating Income represents the difference between sales 
and total operating expenses   
Retained Earnings 
(WC03495) 
 
Retained Earnings represent the accumulated after tax 
earnings of the company which have not been distributed as 
dividends to shareholders or allocated to a reserve account. 
   
Total Liabilities 
(WC03351) 
Total Liabilities represent all short and long term 
obligations expected to be satisfied by the company. 
It includes but is not restricted to: Current Liabilities, Long 
Term Debt, Provision for Risk and Charges (non-U.S. 
corporations), Deferred taxes, Deferred income, Other 
liabilities 
  
Working capital 
(WC03151) 
Working Capital represents the difference between current 
assets and current liabilities. It is a measure of liquidity and 
solvency. 
   
Source: Thomson Reuters Datastream via Lund University Finance Society (LINC).  
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Appendix II – Adjustment Costs 
Following the approach by Leary and Roberts (2005), a modified Altman Z-score is 
utilized as a proxy for debt-related adjustment costs. The rationale behind this proxy is 
that firms with a lower Z-score (indicating a higher probability of financial distress) 
face higher costs of debt and, thus, may be less likely to immediately react to return-
induced changes in leverage. In comparison to the standard score as proposed by 
Altman (1968), the fraction of market value of equity over accounting liabilities has 
been excluded from the modified Z-score and the weight of the sales-related value has 
been upward-adjusted to 1: 
(A1)       
  
 
      
  
 
     
    
 
 
 
 
 
In order to test the impact of differing adjustment costs on rebalancing behaviour, a 
similar approach to the one utilized to test the impact of maturity (see subchapter 3.5) is 
employed: the entire sample is clustered according to the comparative value of the Z-
score of the respective company within a year. If a company´s Z-score is above/below 
the median firm´s score of the sample year, the firm is clustered into the respective 
subsample that represent differing degrees of adjustment costs. 
Thereafter, the basic regression specification (equation 3) is run separately on the two 
subsamples utilizing the Fama-MacBeth procedure.  
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Table A1: Descriptive Statistics – Adjustment Cost Subsamples 
 
 
Table A2: Regression Results on the Adjustment Cost Subsamples
43
 
  
                                                 
43 The regressions are estimated in the style of equation and (19) and equation (20), respectively. The values in 
parenthesis denote Fama-MacBeth standard errors. Asterisks denote statistical significance at 10% (*), 5% (**) and 
1% (***) levels of confidence. 
Description Abreviation Mean Median
Standard 
Deviation Mean Median
Standard 
Deviation Mean Median
Standard 
Deviation
1. Actual Debt Ratio ADRt 41.0 40.7 21.4
2. Implied Debt Ratio IDRt,t+k 40.7 39.9 21.9 39.9 38.1 22.6 38.2 36.7 22.7
3. Market Value Et+Dt 5,410 971 15,123
4. Total accounting assets At 3,532 672 11,035
5. Sales St 5,043 958 14,490
6. Modified Altman Z-Score Zt 2.63 2.45 0.73
1. Actual Debt Ratio ADRt 59.0 62.5 22.4
2. Implied Debt Ratio IDRt,t+k 59.7 62.8 22.8 59.5 62.5 23.1 58.4 60.2 22.8
3. Market Value Et+Dt 19,182 1,868 43,996
4. Total accounting assets At 16,380 1,419 38,988
5. Sales St 11,032 1,220 25,710
6. Modified Altman Z-Score Zt 0.96 1.28 2.10
1. Net debt issuing TDNIt,t+k 3.6 1.8 12.1 12.4 6.3 27.7 22.4 13.2 40.2
2. Net equity issuing before dividends ENIt,t+k 0.8 0.0 4.7 3.0 0.0 11.2 5.5 0.0 18.3
3. Debt and equity issuing TDNIt,t+k + ENIt,t+k 4.4 1.9 14.7 15.3 7.1 33.6 27.9 14.2 52.8
4. Total euro return rt,t+k * Et 6.4 3.4 26.7 21.8 9.9 57.8 42.2 23.4 88.8
5. Induced equity growth xt,t+k * Et 4.5 1.6 26.6 15.8 5.4 56.6 31.4 14.6 85.5
1. Net debt issuing TDNIt,t+k 1.7 0.9 15.2 7.9 2.9 37.6 13.6 7.7 47.3
2. Net equity issuing before dividends ENIt,t+k 1.6 0.0 5.9 5.3 0.4 14.5 8.8 2.2 19.7
3. Debt and equity issuing TDNIt,t+k + ENIt,t+k 3.4 1.4 17.7 14.2 6.5 46.2 24.5 13.9 63.0
4. Total euro return rt,t+k * Et 3.0 0.7 22.9 14.3 5.0 52.2 24.7 10.7 77.0
5. Induced equity growth xt,t+k * Et 2.0 -0.1 22.7 11.2 1.8 50.8 19.2 5.0 74.4
Panel A1: High Z-Score Firm Capital Structure Ratios (%) and Firm Characteristics
Panel B1: High Z-Score Firm Issuing Activities (%), normalized by Market Value and Winsorized (%)
Panel A2: Low Z-ScoreFirm Capital Structure Ratios (%) and Firm Characteristics
Panel B2: Low Z-Score Firm Issuing Activities (%), normalized by Market Value and Winsorized (%)
One-Year Three-Year Five-Year
Horizon k R² T
1-year 0.945 (0.136) *** 0.070 (0.132) ** 0.924 22
3-year 0.924 (0.144) *** 0.119 (0.136) *** 0.778 20
5-year 0.837 (0.147) *** 0.225 (0.136) *** 0.690 18
1-year 0.998 (0.131) *** -0.003 (0.131) 0.921 22
3-year 0.866 (0.138) *** 0.117 (0.138) *** 0.783 20
5-year 0.848 (0.167) *** 0.129 (0.167) *** 0.654 18
1-year 0.031 (0.031) *** 0.920 (0.137) *** 0.035 (0.133) 0.932 22
3-year 0.092 (0.092) *** 0.881 (0.131) *** -0.014 (0.137) 0.824 20
5-year 0.120 (0.049) *** 0.771 (0.145) *** 0.051 (0.155) 0.761 18
1-year 0.039 (0.029) *** 0.987 (0.138) *** -0.048 (0.140) 0.929 22
3-year 0.123 (0.056) *** 0.802 (0.134) *** -0.003 (0.155) 0.836 20
5-year 0.165 (0.080) *** 0.837 (0.159) *** -0.106 (0.191) ** 0.726 18
Panel A2. High Adjustment Cost - Without Intercept
Panel B2. High Adjustment Cost - With Intercept
Panel A1. Low Adjustment Cost - Without Intercept
Panel B1. Low Adjustment Cost - With Intercept
ADRt     IDRt,t+k c
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Appendix III – Statistical Tests 
First, it has to be stated that the performed statistics in this thesis were performed using 
Fama-MacBeth type regressions. However, since the handled data was panel data, the 
hereinafter results test the OLS assumptions using panel data as underlying basis 
(except for cross-sectional and serial correlations). 
The tests reported below have also been completed for the maturity-related subsamples. 
In view of the fact that the obtained results were systematically the same, they remain 
unreported.  
 
a) Normal Distribution 
Normal distribution in a regression could be tested through a Bera-Jarque test (Brooks 
2008, 161ff).The Bera-Jarque test can be described as follows: 
(A2)     
  
 
 
 
       
  
 . 
The Bera-Jarque test statistic follows a χ2(2) under the null hypothesis which implies a 
symmetric and mesokurtic distribution of the series; when using the residuals from the 
OLS regression b1 and b2 can be determined (Brooks 2008, 161ff). 
The null hypothesis describes the normality of disturbances. If rejected, it may be the 
case that residuals from the regression model are either skewed or 
leptokurtic/platykurtic (or both). Testing the null-hypothesis for the eight panel 
regressions (with/without intercept; one-, three-, five-, and ten-year horizon) it was 
found that the null hypothesis is rejected. This might imply that the interferences made 
about the coefficient estimates could be wrong. However, according to Brooks (2008, 
163), large sample sizes can be assumed to alleviate this affect (central limit theorem). 
This thesis covers a large sample of 2154 firm-years across 22 years. Therefore, it is 
less likely that non-normality will affect inferences about coefficient estimates. In 
addition, an observation of the graphical distribution of values yielded that the 
distribution curve presents a bell shaped form. 
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b) Heteroscedasticity  
The assumption of homoscedasticity can be tested with White´s test. In order to perform 
White´s test, it is required to construct an auxiliary regression. For the actual debt ratio 
(      ) this regression is comprised as follows:  
(A3)   
                             
             
                        
where    is a disturbance term which is independent of    (Brooks 2008, 134f). The 
following Lagrange Multiplier test uses the obtained    from the auxiliary regressions 
and multiplies it by the number of the respective observations (for one-, three-, five-, 
and ten-year) so it can be demonstrated that 
(A4)                
where   denotes the number of regressors in the auxiliary regression (the constant term 
is not considered). The results of the White´s test are displayed in Table A3. For all 
considered time horizons the    does not exceed the respective critical values (CV). 
Hence, the null hypotheses that the errors are homoscedastic cannot be rejected at a 
confidence interval of 5%.  
 
Table A3: White´s Test Results 
 
c) Serial Correlation  
As Fama and French (1998) recognize, the Fama-MacBeth type regression has the 
drawback that the sample autocorrelation of the slope is not precise. To correct for this 
caveat, the authors follow Fama and French´s (1998) less formal approach which 
suggests that a higher t-statistic of about 2.8 or 3.0 (rather than usually 2.0) is required 
to conclude reliable interferences. Consequently, special attention is given to the 
statistical significance of coefficient estimates as indicated by       
 
 
X² CV X² CV X² CV X² CV
ADRt+k 2.20 11.07 9.00 11.07 6.61 11.07 10.68 11.07
Horizon
1 Year 3 Years 5 Years 10 Years
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d) Cross-Sectional Correlation 
The Fama-MacBeth procedure estimates standard errors that are corrected for cross-
sectional correlation of the residuals (Cochrane 2005, 228ff; Fama and French 2002).  
 
e) Multicollinearity  
The linear correlation between the independent variables of the regression model 
(equation 3) can be examined with the aid of Variance Inflation Factors (   ), which 
are calculated as 
(A5)      
 
    
 . 
Here,     values above the standard cut-off value of 10 suggest a multicollinearity 
problem in the regression model (Bajpai 2010, 548). Table A4 indicates all     values 
are below the critical value. In addition, it should be noted that     values reduce with 
an increasing time horizon.  
 
Table A4: Variance Inflation Factors 
 
 
 
  
1 Year 3 Years 5 Years 10 Years
With Intercept 9.83 7.29 5.15 2.84
Witout Intercept 8.09 6.07 3.93 2.30
Horizon
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Appendix IV – Model Robustness 
In order to test the obtained results by using the Fama-MacBeth regression approach a 
pooled regression is deployed (see Table A5). When pooling all firm-years the 
estimated Fama-MacBeth coefficient estimates can be largely confirmed. For instance, 
over an annual horizon the constant is 0.040 (Fama-MacBeth: 0.034), the lagged actual 
debt ratio is -0.031 (-0.016) and the implied debt ratio is 0.969 (0.966).  
 
Table A5: Pooled Regression on the Entire Sample
44
 
 
 
  
                                                 
44 The regressions are with a pooled OLS regression. The values in parenthesis denote standard errors. Asterisks 
denote statistical significance at 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) levels of confidence. 
Horizon k R² N
1-year 0.989 (0.015) *** 0.013 (0.015) 0.935 2154
3-year 0.936 (0.018) *** 0.069 (0.018) *** 0.804 1591
5-year 0.869 (0.023) *** 0.138 (0.023) *** 0.665 1158
10-year 0.610 (0.042) *** 0.415 (0.038) *** 0.426 455
1-year 0.040 (0.003) *** 0.969 (0.014) *** -0.031 (0.015) * 0.940 2154
3-year 0.097 (0.006) *** 0.886 (0.016) *** -0.041 (0.018) ** 0.834 1591
5-year 0.138 (0.009) *** 0.805 (0.021) *** -0.028 (0.023) 0.724 1158
10-year 0.209 (0.019) *** 0.591 (0.037) *** 0.093 (0.044) * 0.548 455
c     IDRt,t+k ADRt 
A. Without Intercept
B. With Intercept
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